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I. Introduction
Since the advent of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1995,' efforts to broaden participation have largely succeeded,
seeing membership rise to a total of 148 members as of February
2005.2 This constitutes an increase of 20 from the 128 original
"contracting parties" who signed the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994 that created the WTO.3 This
expansion, however, has not come without bumps in the road.
One primary obstacle is the continued tension between so-called
"developed" and "developing" countries, which has led to
deadlock within the WTO process.4 At present, the WTO is
considering proposals to make the negotiation process more
transparent and geographically inclusive,5 which could reflect the
ongoing tensions between world economic powers and developing
nations within the negotiations.6
Though the ongoing negotiations can still be wrapped in
secrecy, the process of resolving disputes under the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) is subject to a highly
formalistic legal process.7 From aircraft to agricultural products,
pet food to periodicals, countries seeking to correct violations of
the general WTO agreement have successfully used the dispute
settlement process to further their interests.8 The sheer volume of
I See, e.g., MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C.
MATROVIDIS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW PRACTICE AND POLICY 7 (2006).
2 Members and Observers, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/
tifie/org6_e.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
3 The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmem-e.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
4 MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 1, at 14-15.
5 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 14-17.
6 See infra Section V.
7 See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU], available at http://www.wto.org/
english/docs.e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
8 For a full cataloging of goods and services that have been subject to the dispute
resolution process, see Dispute Settlement: Index of Disputes,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dispu-subjects-indexe.htm. In many
ways, the availability of this information draws the sharpest contrast between the general
negotiation and dispute resolution processes.
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disputes, as well as the concentration of claims against two
parties-the United States and the European Community (EC)-
indicates that the developing world has a new tool at its disposal to
pursue its concerns internationally.9
One particularly challenging area for progress in the trade
liberalization process is agriculture; in many ways it is ground
zero for the recurring conflict between developed and developing
nations. As one commentator explains,
Agriculture is a sensitive topic in virtually every country. In
general, agricultural products are easily exported, so the
potential for trade is vast. Yet, every country seeks to maximize
economic advantages for its own agricultural sector for social,
economic and political reasons. Thus, agricultural trade has
been a topic of almost continuous negotiations and was singled
out for special treatment even in the GATT 1947.0
In particular, developing countries have few opportunities other
than agriculture for trade and development" while developed
countries seek to defend their rapidly diminishing competitive
advantage in agricultural production.1 2 The same can be said for
developing countries attempting to invest in textiles as a first step
in the industrialization process.3
As such, the recent dispute between the United States and
Brazil over American subsidies on upland cotton falls at the
intersection of all these issues" and may portend a change in
conventional thinking about international trade. Accordingly, this
9 See generally Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, Disputes by Country,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/dispu-by-countrye.htm. Since its
inception, 46 nations have brought over 330 claims, with the United States or EC acting
as complainant or respondent in roughly half of all disputes brought. Id.
10 MATSUSHITA ET. AL., supra note 1, at 135.
11 THE WTO, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE DOHA AGENDA: PROSPECTS AND
CHALLENGES FOR TRADE-LED GROwTH 39-40 (Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis ed., 2004)
(estimating that fully one-sixth of all welfare gains from trade liberalization for
developing countries will come from reformed farm policies) [hereinafter DOHA
Agenda].
12 See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 135, 140-41.
13 DOHA Agenda, supra note 11, at 40.
14 See generally Appellate Body Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/DS 267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Cotton Report],
available at http://www.wto.orglenglishltratop-e/dispu-e/267abr_e.pdf.
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comment will compare the American cotton subsidy program and
U.S. commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
then it will discuss the WTO dispute resolution process and its
ability to bind member nations legally. After an in-depth
examination of the U.S.-Brazil upland cotton dispute, this
comment will examine both the immediate fallout from the case
and discuss the future to determine the potential impact of this
case on the current Doha Round negotiations and future reform of
the WTO.
II. American Cotton Production-Market Dynamics and
Federal Subsidies
A. General Statistics
In general, cotton production in the United States is limited to
the southern region of the country, stretching from Virginia down
through the Carolinas, continuing through Georgia, and winding
westward through a belt of contiguous states to California. 5 In
recent years, the cash receipts from U.S. cotton production have
averaged roughly $4.7 billion annually. 6 One of the most
significant value-added crops in the United States, the retail value
of the 8.2 billion pounds of cotton harvested, processed, and
handled domestically is nearly $120 billion annually. 17
The United States is the world's largest cotton exporter,
accounting for 25% of the world's cotton trade, with 40% of
American raw cotton scheduled for export markets. 8 However, in
recent years, the United States' seeming advantage in cotton
exports has eroded. Despite utilizing increasingly mechanized
cultivation techniques, cotton production is still heavily labor
intensive.' 9 In fact, labor costs are one of the key factors in
15 See National Cotton Council of America, Where Cotton Grows, http://
www.cotton.org/pubs/cottoncounts/story/where.cfm.
16 National Cotton Women's Committee, Cotton Counts, http://
www.cotton.org/pubs/cottoncounts/upload/Cotton-Counts.pdf.
17 Id.
18 NORA L. BROOKS, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA CHARACTERISTICS AND
PRODUCTION COSTS OF U.S. COTrON FARMS 2 (2001),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/sb974-2/sb974-2.pdf.
19 Id. at 5.
[Vol. XXXH
WTO-COTTON SUBSIDIES
determining the domestic competitiveness of U.S. producers.2 0 In
addition, general input prices, including the cost of the seed,
fertilizer, pest and weed control, as well as gasoline, have put
additional upward pressure on U.S. production costs.2
While global demand for cotton continues to out-pace supply,22
global production continues to grow throughout the developing
world, with world exports expected to increase by nearly 15%
between 2005 and 2006.23 In particular, developing countries like
China, India, and Brazil are adding significantly to both the world
supply and demand for cotton. 4 This is in contrast to the United
States, which continues to increase exports, as its textile industry
gradually declines in the face of competition from global
25
competitors.
One of the main reasons for the burgeoning foreign textile
industry is the recent expiration of the MultiFibre Arrangement
(MFA) created under the GATT. Under this agreement, the MFA
"allowed states to impose high quotas on imported clothing and
textiles. ' '26 With the MFA's expiration, textiles and apparel will
be integrated into the normal WTO framework over the next ten
20 Id.
21 See generally GARY ADAMS, STEVE SLINSKY, SHAWN BOYD & MICHELLE
HUFFMAN, SOLUTIONS THROUGH STRENGTH: THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR U.S. COITON,
47-49 (2004), http://www.cotton.org/econ/upload/Economic-Outlook-for-U-S-Cotton-
2004.pdf.
22 Id. at 48.
23 USDA, Foreign Ag. Serv., Cotton: World Markets and Trade, U.S. Market
Share Likely Declines in 2005/06 [hereinafter World Markets and Trade], available at
http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2005/10/toc.htm.
24 See generally ADAMS ET AL., supra note 21, at 35-42. China is both the world's
largest cotton producer and supplier, producing roughly 20 billion bales annually, and
consuming over 30 billion bales in 2004. Id. Likewise, India, which produces and
consumes roughly 13 billion bales annually, and Brazil, which produces five billion
bales, and consumes roughly three billion bales, have made large gains in production in
order to keep pace with domestic demand. Id. Increased demand, in combination with
strong global prices, have spurred all three nations to plant additional acres of cotton in
recent years. Id.
25 Id. at 24-25. In 2002, U.S. apparel production decreased by 12.9%, and home
furnishings fell by 5.7%, with nearly 92 textile mills closing in 2002 and 2003 alone,
shedding some 200,000 employees in the process. Id.
26 MATSUSHITAETAL., supra note 1, at 141.
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years, eliminating the high quotas."7 While it is too early to
analyze its economic effects, the United States scrambled to
complete bilateral textile negotiations to provide interim treatment
and quotas on Chinese textile products at the request of Members
of Congress from textile producing states.28 With the growth in
China's supply and demand for cotton,29 it is unlikely that the
expiration of the MFA and the United States' urgency in moving
to bilateral negotiations was merely coincidental.
To summarize, the U.S. cotton industry faces increasingly stiff
global competition as developing countries expand domestic
production and consumption. Foreign apparel production is likely
to grow with the expiration of the MFA, which allowed protective
tariffs and quotas on apparel and textile products.30 Finally, while
the global market for cotton continues to grow with expectations
of greater demand, another of the United States' competitive
advantages comes under attack-its generous program of domestic
subsidies and marketing promotion payments to domestic cotton
producers.3
B. The U.S. Cotton Program: Domestic Marketing Payments
and Export Subsidies
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 provides
for multiple levels of payment support and marketing assistance
for cotton producers.32 As a result, the United States Department
27 Id.; see also WTO, Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) The Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/texti-e/texintroe.htm. The
framework under the GATT was known as the MFA. The provisional document
bridging the GATT and the WTO Agreement is known as the WTO Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Id. Most commentators, including this one, continue to
address the agreement in its previous name, the MFA.
28 WVTO, Facts on Textiles: Benefits from Establishing Quotas on Certain Chinese
Apparel Exports to the United States, http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/
FactSheets/2005/asset_upload file8l3_8339.pdf. It appears as well that such bilateral
agreements are permitted by the MFA and the general WTO framework, as the MFA
called for "fair and equitable trading conditions," which are likely from a bilateral
agreement. See WTO, A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs elegal-e/ursum-e.htm#cAgreement.
29 See ADAMS ET AL., supra note 21, at 34-35, 40-41.
30 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 141.
31 See generally Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14.
32 Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, 7 U.S.C § 7901 (2005)
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of Agriculture (USDA) expenditures for cotton averaged nearly $3
billion annually between 2000 and 2003."3 Understanding the
scope of U.S. commodity programs is essential to understanding
U.S. commitments under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
which is explained below in section II.C.
Enrollment in USDA commodity programs is optional for
farmers, but nearly all producers take advantage of the multi-
layered commodity program to facilitate their annual production.34
Current programs are in sharp contrast to the New Deal-era
policies of income and price support, which, along with strict
supply management in the form of acreage limits and storage
programs, ended with the passage of the 1996 Farm Bill.35
Following a similar philosophy as the 1996 law, the 2002 Farm
Bill provides direct payments to farmers based on historical
acreage estimates, rather than on current production or commodity
supply concerns.36 Producers who enroll in the program can
update their acreage using an average of their acreage planted in
the 1998 through 2001 crop years.37 Direct payments are paid
regardless of commodity price, and are based on a payment rate
set by the 2002 Farm Bill.38
[hereinafter 2002 Farm Bill].
33 USDA, Farm Service Agency, CCC Net Outlays by Commodity and Function,
Table 35 http://www.fsa.usda.govlnternet/FSAFile/ccc2_msr2007_table35pdf.pdf. Cf.
Cotton Counts, supra note 16 (stating that total cash receipts for annual U.S. cotton
production average nearly $4.7 billion).
34 See generally Anne B. W. Effland, U.S. Farm Policy: The First 200 Years,
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK, March 2000, at 25, available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/
publications/agoutlook/mar2000/ao269g.pdf.
35 Id. at 24; see also USDA, Economic Research Service, Briefing Rooms, Farm
and Commodity Policy: Background and Issues, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
FarmPolicy/background.htm.
36 USDA Farm Service Agency, Upland Cotton: Summary of 2002 Commodity
Loan and Payment Program, available at www.cotton.org/econ/cropinfo/upload/
upcot03.pdf.
37 Id.
38 Id.; see also USDA, Economic Research Service, 2002 Farm Bill: Analysis of
Selected Provisions: Direct Payments, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/farmbill/
analysis/DirectPayments2002act.htm. The formula for calculating direct payments for
cotton can be expressed as follows:
Dlcotn = (payment rate)catton x (payment yield),otto x ([Base acres],otton x 0.85)
Cotton's payment rate, as provided in the 2002 Farm Bill, is roughly 7 cents per pound.
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Following passage of the 1996 Farm Bill, Congress authorized
nearly $30 billion in emergency assistance over the course of four
years to farmers due to low market price and natural disaster.39
Responding to the ad hoc payments that provided uncertain relief
to producers, the 2002 Farm Bill added to the direct payment
program.4° The 2002 law created a new program of counter-
cyclical payments to producers." Its purpose was to provide a
more stable safety net for farmers transitioning to a more market-
based approach to farming without the acreage restrictions that
were a feature of prior farm programs.42  Similar to direct
payments, counter-cyclical payments are based on a historical
average of payment yields from 1998 through 2001. Unlike
direct payments, which are paid in full regardless of the "effective
price" for a commodity,' the USDA makes counter-cyclical
payments whenever the market price of the commodity falls below
a statutorily determined target price.45
Id. It is unclear how this rate was determined, whether by actual demonstrated need or
out of budgetary expedience.
39 Press Release, House Committee on Agriculture, Farm Bill Final Passage:
President Praises Legislation; Awaits Senate to Concur (May 2, 2002), available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/press/107/pr020502.html.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 USDA, Economic Research Service, Briefing Rooms, Farm and Commodity
Policy: Program Provisions, Counter Cyclical Income Payments [hereinafter Counter
Cyclical Income Payments], http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/Counter
CyclicalPay.htm.
44 USDA, Economic Research Service, Briefing Rooms, Farm and Commodity
Policy: Program Provisions, Direct Payments, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/
FarmPolicy/DirectPayments.htm. "Effective price" is the direct payment rate plus the
larger of the national loan rate, which is set by the USDA on a county-by-county basis
and the national average market price during that same year. USDA, Economic
Research Service, Briefing Rooms, Farm and Commodity Policy: Program Provisions,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/2002malp.htm. It is interesting to note,
however, that what policy makers deem a transition to market-based farming includes
the effective equivalent of price supports in the form of counter-cyclical payments.
45 Counter Cyclical Income Payments, supra note 43; see also USDA, Economic
Research Service, Farm Bill, Analysis of Selected Provisions, Counter-Cyclical
Payments, http://www.ers.usda.gov/Features/Farmbill/analysis/counterCyclicalPayments
2002act.htm. The target price provided by the 2002 Farm Bill for cotton is $0.724 per
pound. Id. The formula for calculating both the historical payment rate as well as the
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In addition to these payments, the USDA also provides an
extensive system of marketing loans through the Commodity
Credit Corporation (CCC).46 First, the Marketing Loan Program
allows producers to repay nonrecourse commodity loans at a lower
rate whenever the world price or the loan repayment rate is lower
than the farmer's contracted loan rate.47 In exchange for the lower
loan rate, the producer extends his expected crop as collateral to
secure the loan.48 Repayment rates for these loans are calculated
on a county-by-county basis weekly, and the world price is also
calculated every week.49 Should a farmer repay the loan at a lower
world or county repayment rate, the gain accrues to the farmer as a
program benefit.5"
The separate Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) program
attempts to eliminate the refinancing aspects of the Marketing
Loan Program, while allowing the producer all of the same gain.5
Instead of taking out a marketing loan, producers receive a
payment in the amount of the difference between the loan rate and
the current county or world price.52 In essence, these loans
supplement the effect of the counter-cyclical payments to make
farmers whole should commodity prices fall over the course of the
farm year.
Commodity assistance is not limited to direct and counter-
counter-cyclical payment can be expressed as follows:
Payment ratecotton = (target price)cotton - (direct payment rate)oto,, - (higher of
commodity price or loan rate)cotton
CCPcotton = ([Base acres]cotton x 0.85) x (payment yield)cotton x (payment
rate)cotton
Id.
46 See, e.g., USDA, Economic Research Service, Farm Bill, Marketing Assistance
Loans and LDPs [hereinafter Marketing Assistance], http://www.ers.usda.gov/
features/farmbill/analysis/marketingLoan2002act.htm.
47 USDA, Economic Research Service, Farm Bill: Glossary, http://
www.ers.usda.gov/features/farmbill/2002glossary.htm#mlp.
48 Marketing Assistance, supra note 46.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. Like the direct and counter-cyclical payments, the loan repayment rate for
marketing assistance payments and LDPs is defined by statute. For cotton, the loan
repayment rate is $0.52 per pound. Id.
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cyclical payments. The USDA also sponsors a number of
programs intended to finance exports of U.S. agricultural
products.53 These programs increase aggregate demand and offset
tariffs applied to those commodities by importers.54 Because the
export subsidy offsets applied tariffs, as opposed to domestic
subsidies, which are granted regardless of exports, developing
countries view export subsidies to be of greater concern than the
more diffused production subsidies.5 ' As such, USDA's export
programs, while not as well known to producers, are subject to
much more strenuous regulation in the international arena. 56
The first group of USDA export subsidies is the Export Credit
Guarantee Programs, also known as GSM-102 and GSM-103.57 In
general, these programs were created to "ensure that credit is
available to finance commercial exports of U.S. agricultural
products, while providing competitive credit terms to buyers."58
To this end, the CCC guarantees payments due from foreign banks
to exporters in the United States to facilitate the purchase of
American agricultural products.5 9 Generally, 98% of the principal
and a portion of interest at an adjustable rate are covered through
the program.6 °  Because payment is guaranteed, financial
institutions can offer competitive loan terms to the foreign banks,
lowering the overall cost of export.6' Interested producers arrange
the foreign sale, and then apply to the USDA's Foreign
Agriculture Service (FAS) and CCC to qualify for the guarantee. 2
As a direct result of the WTO's dispute resolution Appellate
Body's decision in United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
53 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 261.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 For a description of the treatment of various types of agricultural subsidies, see
infra Section II.C.
57 USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Fact Sheet Export Credit Guarantee
Programs (GSM-102), [hereinafter Export Credit Programs],
http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/gsm 102-03.asp.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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61
which struck down parts of these programs, the fees paid for
these guarantees are no longer flat, and now require a risk-based
premium to be paid depending on the creditworthiness of the
importer, as well as the terms and length of the guarantee to be
provided.64 In addition, the Appellate Body Cotton Report led to
the suspension of the GSM-103 Credit Guarantee Program, which
extended flat risk guarantees in a similar fashion as GSM-102, but
only for a much longer term, usually ranging from three to ten
years.65 These programs were available for nearly all agricultural
commodities, including cotton.66
Likewise, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton also
altered the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP).67  The
SCGP serves a similar purpose to both GSM-102 and GSM-103,
except it offers its credit guarantees for a shorter duration
(typically 180 days), and guarantees a much smaller percentage of
the credit provided, usually only 65%.68 Akin to GSM-102, the
rate schedule for export financing under SCGP has been altered to
better account for the relative risk of the importer, as well as to
better quantify the overall program costs. 69
Finally, the 2002 Farm Bill created some special marketing
provisions intended to keep domestically-produced cotton
competitive on the global market. 70 Known as Step-i, Step-2, and
Step-3, these provisions include an import quota for foreign-
63 See generally Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14.
64 Export Credit Programs, supra note 57; Press Release, USDA Announces New
On-Line System for U.S. Exporters and Banks (Aug. 25, 2005),
http://www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/PressRelease/pressrel-dout.asp?Entry=valid&PrNum=
0132-05.
65 Export Credit Programs, supra note 57.
66 Id.
67 Press Release, USDA Announces Changes To Export Credit Guarantee
Programs to Comply with WTO Findings, http://www.fas.usda.gov/scriptsw/
PressRelease/pressrel-dout.asp?PrNum=0092-05
68 USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Fact Sheet, Supplier Credit Guarantee
Program, http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/factsheets/scgp. asp.
69 Id.
70 USDA, Economic Research Service, Briefing Rooms, Farm and Commodity
Policy: 1996-2001 Commodity Provisions [hereinafter Special Provisions],
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FarmPolicy/l 996specialProvisions.htm.
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
produced fiber. 7' First, Step-i allows for a further reduction of
loan repayment rates under the marketing loan and LDP
programs.72 These additional reductions are triggered when the
adjusted world price (AWP) of cotton falls below 115% of the
cotton loan rate, and the weekly average U.S.-Northern Europe
(USNE) price exceeds the Northern Europe price quotation.73
With its payment triggered by price indicators, this payment is
another layer on top of the counter-cyclical payments and LDPs
authorized for numerous other U.S. agricultural commodities. 4
Step-2 payments are made to exporters and domestic mills to
subsidize their purchases of higher priced U.S. cotton.75 Under the
2002 Farm Bill, the Step-2 payment rate for the 2002-2005
marketing years is calculated as the difference between the price
of U.S. cotton delivered in Northern Europe and the average of the
five lowest prices of cotton delivered in Northern Europe from any
source, which would likely cover U.S. cotton as well. 76 In its
pleadings before the Appellate Body, the U.S. maintained that
Step-2 payments were part of its domestic support program as they
were targeted to domestic cotton users as well as exporters.77
Finally, the Step-3 program imposes a periodic quota on
imports as follows:
Step-3 authorizes the President to announce a special quota for
upland cotton, if for any consecutive 4-week period, the weekly
average U.S.-Northern Europe price quotation (adjusted for any
certificate value in effect, unless U.S. supplies are extremely
tight) exceeds the Northern Europe price quotation by more than
1.25 cents per pound (the 1.25-cent threshold is delayed until
August 1, 2006). 78
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Appellant's Submission of the United States, United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, WT/DS 267/AB/R (Oct. 28, 2004) 427-30, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Monitoring-Enforcement/Dispute-Settle
ment/WTO/DisputeSettlementListings/assetupload-file938_5598.pdf.
78 Special Provisions, supra note 70.
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In total, the quota is limited to a total of five weeks' of domestic
consumption in order to temporarily lower domestic price.79
Additionally, another small quota provision is triggered by further
domestic market disruption, involving a lower threshold of price
decline over a longer period of time. ° Counter intuitively, these
quota provisions worked to reduce domestic price (through
additional foreign imports) in order to make American cotton
more competitive on the global market.8
In summary, USDA cotton programs provide various
advantages for domestic producers. Direct payments are fixed and
decoupled from both price and current production. 82 Counter-
cyclical payments are not linked to 'production, but are triggered
by target prices that are defined by statute.83 Marketing loans and
LDPs, as well as the Step-i and Step-2 programs, are coupled to
production as well as market price. 84 Export finance programs,
such as GSM-102, GSM-103, and SCGP have been pared down in
recent months, but still provide credit guarantees and facilitate
export of U.S. commodities. 85  Finally, the Step-3 program
provides for limited periodic import quotas triggered by price in
order to maintain the stability of U.S. cotton stocks by regulating
their price to world levels.86  Together, these programs create a
comprehensive safety net for domestic producers that rarely fails
to account for any fluctuation in price, weather-related hardship,
or shift in global politics.
79 Id.
80 Id. This program is known as the limited global import quota. Id.
81 Id.
82 Paul C. Westcott and Leslie A. Meyer, U.S. Cotton Supply Response Under the
2002 Farm Act (Feb. 21, 2003) Agricultural Outlook Forum 2003, available at
http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-bin/pdf-view.pl?paperid=13353&ftype=.pdf.
83 Id.
84 Id.; see also Special Provisions, supra note 70.
85 Export Credit Programs, supra note 57; Press Release, USDA Announces
Changes, supra note 67; Supplier Credit Guarantee Program, supra note 68.
86 Special Provisions, supra note 70.
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C. WTO Framework for Agriculture and Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
Much of the discussion surrounding the current Doha Round
8 7
involves the classification of agricultural subsidies and
countervailing measures into different categories, known as
"boxes."88 This section will first examine the WTO agreements
that provide a framework for domestic and export supports, and
then classify the various commodity programs previously
discussed in II.B into the boxes.
One of the key documents relating to the current cotton dispute
is the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, which was approved as
part of the creation of the WTO in 1995.89 The Preamble of this
Agreement sets out the lofty "long-term objective" to "provide for
substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and
protection sustained over an agreed period of time, resulting in
correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world
agricultural markets." 90 The Agreement then isolates several basic
areas of obligation for its signatory nations: market access,
domestic support, export subsidies, and safeguards. 91
First, under the market access provisions of the Agriculture
Agreement, Article 4, countries agree to convert their existing
framework of quotas and non-tariff barriers into tariffs that could
then be subject to percentage-based cuts in the future.92 With the
move to tariffs, each country will be committed to incorporating
agricultural support into its Schedule of Concessions, which is
87 See generally The Doha Declaration Explained, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop-e/dda e/dohaexplainede.htm. "The Doha Round" is the vernacular for the
current round of multilateral trade negotiations currently progressing through the WTO,
and took its name from the WTO ministerial meeting from which the new talks were
launched. Id. In general, the phrase "the Doha Round" is used to describe the effort to
negotiate a comprehensive agreement to augment and replace the framework achieved in
the formative 1994 Agreement, which was known as the "Uruguay Round." Id.
88 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 n.158.
89 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/14-ag.pdf [hereinafter
Agriculture Agreement].
90 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, pmbl.
91 Id.
92 Id., art. 4; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
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subject to wholesale cuts under the existing GATT and WTO
framework. 93 The Agreement also provides for so-called "tariff
quotas," which provide lower tariff rates for lower amounts of
imports that rapidly climb as imports of that product increase.94 In
general, the goal of this section is to allow for more transparency
to facilitate further cuts in the future while maintaining a
semblance of transitional protection over the short term.95
Next, under the Agriculture Agreement, developed countries
agreed to reduce their "aggregate measurement of support" (AMS)
by 20% over a five-year phase-in period that ended in 2001.96 In
return, developing countries agreed to reduce their AMS by 13.3%
by the beginning of 2005, and least-developed countries were
required to make no concessions at all.97  Interestingly, the
Agriculture Agreement, as well as the entire WTO Agreement,
does not provide any formal definition or criteria for
differentiating between "developing" and "developed" countries,
resulting in what one commentator deems "self-selection" by the
interested parties.98 However, Article XI of the WTO Agreement
does provide some definition for "least developed" countries,
borrowing a definition from the UN Committee for Development
Planning. 99
In addition, the Agreement differentiates between varieties of
domestic support, splitting them into various "boxes."' ° Under
93 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 136.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. See generally Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, arts. 1 & 7 (defining
AMS).
97 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, arts. 15 & 16; see also MATSUSHITA ET
AL., supra note 1, at 136.
98 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 374.
99 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, art. XI.2, Original Membership (1994), available at http://www.
wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/04-wto.pdf [hereinafter WTO Agreement]; MATSUSHITA
ET AL., supra note 1, at 374. This determination is based on four criteria: "per capita
income, population size, quality of life index and economic diversification."
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note I, at 374 (citing UNESCOR, 29th Sess. Supp. No. 2, at
64, 67, U.N. Doc. E/1994/22 (1994)).
100 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 6, annex 2; MATSUSHITA ET AL.,
supra note i, at 137.
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Article 6 of the Agriculture Agreement, exempt subsidies are split
into two categories: "green box" and "blue box" subsidies. 1'
"Green box" subsidies include domestic food aid, direct payments
to producers, decoupled income support, research, environmental
programs, extension, training, advisory services, and crop
insurance.102  "Blue box" subsidies include specially permitted
subsidies for developing countries, "de minimis" subsidies that are
roughly 5-10% of the annual value of the commodity produced,
and other subsidies for developing countries specifically designed
to limit agricultural production. 3 In contrast to exempt subsidies,
which have no effect on trade, "amber box" subsidies are those
limited by Article 6 because they distort trade or production.'
4
These payments include "measures to support prices, or subsidies
directly related to production quantities"' 1 5 and they are subject to
limits, "as 'de minimis' supports are allowed (5% of agricultural
production for developed countries, 10% for developing
countries)."' 1 6 By agreement, "the 30 WTO members that had
larger subsidies than the de minimis levels at the beginning of the
post-Uruguay Round reform period are committed to reduce these
subsidies."'0 7 These commitments to reduce amber box subsidies
are made in terms of percentage reductions of "Total AMS" over a
specified period of time, which includes all support for individual
products combined with general commodity-generic supports.
10 8
In many ways, compliance with WTO commitments is self-
enforcing. As part of the 1994 Agreement, twenty-eight countries
agreed to set ceilings on AMS and to reduce payments by 20% by
2000, with calculation of AMS to be completed by the individual
101 Id.
102 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, annex 2; USDA, Economic Research
Service, Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments AGRICULTURAL
OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 12 [hereinafter U.S. Farm Policy], available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/AgOutlook/Jan2002/ao288d.pdf.
103 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 6; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 137 n.158.
104 WTO, Agriculture Background, Domestic Support in Agriculture, The Boxes,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/agric-e/agboxes-e.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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countries.l°9 Total domestic AMS is calculated by adding together
all of the payments that fall into the green, blue, and amber boxes,
after first subtracting domestic food aid, government expenditures
for research and inspection, as well as exempt blue, green, and de
minimis payments."1 United States AMS equaled roughly half of
the allowed amount in 1998; however, the United States provided
nearly 80% of its permitted ceiling through additional payments to
producers in 1999 and 2000."' From a global view, even before
the 2002 Farm Bill, the United States provided a higher level of
economic support for its producers than any other country in the
world, with support equaling 23% of total agricultural
production. 112 In order to comply with WTO commitments, the
2002 Farm Bill, which increased annual spending on agriculture
by roughly $5 billion annually," 3 provides for a "circuit breaker,"
which requires the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to modify or
restrict commodity payments to avoid exceeding the WTO
domestic payment ceilings." l4  As a matter of comparison, the
United States' ceiling for targeted AMS is one quarter of that
provided by the European Union.' 15
In addition to curtailing domestic supports, the Agreement also
reduces export subsidies." 6 Under this section, export subsidies
are reduced in value by 36%, and 21% in volume for developed
countries; for developing countries, export subsidies are reduced
109 Fredrick J. Nelson, Aligning U.S. Farm Policy with World Trade Commitments,
AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK, Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 12.
110 Id at 13.
I"I Id.
112 STEVEN ZAHNISER, ED YOUNG & JOHN WAINIO, RECENT AGRICULTURAL POLICY
REFORMS IN NORTH AMERICA 2-3 (2005), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/
WRS0503/wrsO5O3.pdf.
113 Press Release, House Comm. on Agric., Farm Security and Rural Investment:
President Praises Legislation, Awaits Senate to Concur (May 2, 2002), available at
http://agriculture.house.gov/press/107/pr020502.html.
114 ZAHNISER ET AL., supra note 112, at 8.
115 USDA Domestic Support Today, http://www.fas.
usda.gov/itp/wto/hongkong/domesticsupport.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2007). At present,
the United States' ceiling for AMS is $19 billion, with the European Union capping its
AMS at $88 billion annually. Id.
116 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. I (e), Art. 9(2)(b)(iv); MATSUSHITA ET
AL., supra note 1, at 137.
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by 24% and 14%, respectively." 7  Additional phase-outs have
been proposed for the next phase of liberalization, along with a
broadening of the definition of export subsidies to include food aid
and export credit"
18
As defined in Part II.B, the commodity payments for cotton are
included in the estimate of AMS. Specifically, direct commodity
payments are green box payments, as they are not coupled with
price or acreage.119 In contrast, because they are both linked to
price, counter-cyclical payments as well as Marketing Assistance
Loans and LDPs fall into the trade-distorting and limited "amber
box.' 120  Because the United States does not make payments
intended to restrict supply, it has no programs that fall into the
"blue box."' 12
1
These classifications are essential to analysis of United
States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, for the key to the dispute lies
in conflicting estimates and definitions of these payments-are
U.S. payments and subsidies for cotton really in excess of its
category-by-category caps? Because these commitments were
imposed on a voluntary basis by all the countries, and compliance
with these commitments is largely self-reported, the question
remains how a nation that believes another is reneging on its
commitments can prove these accusations and obtain a remedy.
D. Subsidies and Counter-Measures Agreement (SCM)
An additional layer of regulation of subsidies and other trade
distorting payments and programs is embodied in the Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM), which, like the
Agreement on Agriculture, was appended to the 1994 WTO
foundational agreement. 122  It is difficult to make general
117 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 9(2)(b)(iv).
118 WTO, Agriculture Negotiations Background, Export Subsidies and Competition,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratopelagric-e/negs-bkgrnd8export-e.htm (last visited
Mar. 6, 2007).
119 Nelson, supra note 109, at 13; see also Upland Cotton: Summary of 2002
Commodity Loan and Payment System, supra note 36.
120 Nelson, supra note 109, at 14. Note as well that the calculation of amber box
payments is central to ongoing compliance actions in the wake of United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton.
121 Id. at 12.
122 Agreement of Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 2004, Marrakesh
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statements regarding the nature of subsidies, but two statements
are generally true-the merit of the subsidy largely depends on its
context, and in terms of the WTO, context is largely left to the eye
of the beholder. 123  As such, the SCM was intended to define
subsidies, regulate their use, and prescribe potential policy
responses for nations adversely affected by the subsidies of other
nations. 24  The agreement focuses on subsidies, which can be
broadly defined as a "benefit that is not earned,'' 125  and
countervailing duties, which are "'dut[ies] imposed [on imports] to
offset the advantage to foreign producers derived from a subsidy
that their government offers for the production or export of the
article taxed."",1
26
Based on these principles, Part I of the SCM provides a more
elaborate definition of subsidies, and introduces the concept of
"specificity," which is designed to determine "whether the subsidy
is available only to an enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries."' 127 In addition, Parts III, IV, and V of the
SCM establish three categories of subsidies-prohibited or "red
light" subsidies, actionable or "amber light" subsidies, and non-
actionable or "green light" subsidies.22' For prohibited and
actionable subsidies, the SCM provides remedies for adversely
affected parties.'29 In the case of the more difficult to define
actionable subsidies, the SCM requires a finding of "serious
prejudice" before any remedy is permitted. 30
Under Article 3.1, the SCM Agreement exempts most
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs--.e/legal e/24-scm_01_e.htm [hereinafter SCM].
123 See generally MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 260-63.
124 Id. at 262-63.
125 Id. at 260.
126 Id. at 262 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993)).
127 SCM, supra note 122, arts. 1, 2.1; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note i, at 264.
128 SCM, supra note 122, arts. 3-8; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 264. This
same framework of color-coded categories of payments that is reflected in the green,
amber, and blue "boxes" of the Agriculture Agreement. Id.
129 SCM, supra note 122, art. 4, 7.
130 SCM, supra note 122, art. 6. This Article of the SCM provides some objective
standards as to what constitutes "serious prejudice," but the provisions are broadly
drafted giving a potential complainant or dispute resolution panel plenty of flexibility.
Id.
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agricultural subsidies, intending to allow for the regulation of the
sensitive issue of agricultural subsidies to the Agreement on
Agriculture. 3' The Agreement on Agriculture contains what is
referred to as the "peace clause," which encourages the "due
restraint" of members from pursuing formal dispute settlement
proceedings if the offending nations' agricultural subsidies are
consistent with the Agreement on Agriculture.'32 The "peace
clause," however, expired at the end of 2004 and complaining
nations have used this to prosecute possible violations of the
Agriculture Agreement in the dispute resolution process described
in Part III.A.' 33
In summary, the SCM Agreement categorizes three types of
subsidies-prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable-whose
definitions largely mirror those in the Agriculture Agreement. 13 4
These labels are used across sectors and across agreements within
the larger WTO Agreement. 135 However, because of the "peace
clause," the specific terms of what is "prohibited" or "actionable"
depends, in the case of agricultural subsidies, on the specific terms
of the Agriculture Agreement. 136 As such, the failure of the Doha
Round to produce new market reforms for agriculture, and the
subsequent lapsing of the "peace clause," have resulted in the use
of the SCM Agreement to prosecute possible violations of the
Agriculture Agreement through the Dispute Settlement Board
(DSB) process described later in this Comment. 137
As a result, the Appellate Body considering United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton was forced to consider whether U.S.
subsidies violated not only the specifics of the Agriculture
Agreement, but also whether these violations resulted in "serious
131 SCM, supra note 122, art. 3.1.
132 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 13; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 265.
133 Id.
134 See supra notes 124 & 126 and accompanying text.
135 Id.
136 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 13; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 265.
137 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art. 13; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1,
at 265
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prejudice" as required under the SCM.'38 It is unclear whether
future DSB proceedings on agricultural matters will have to
consider the dispute under both the Agriculture Agreement and the
SCM, or whether the application of one agreement over another
would make a material difference in future cases. Regardless, the
failure to reach a substantive agreement through the Doha Round
has added further complication to the already difficult process of
administering the current WTO subsidy regime.
III.WTO Dispute Settlement Process and Procedure
A. Background
One of the defining characteristics of the WTO is its emphasis
on multilateral agreements based on consensus. 3 9 The WTO
Agreement provides that "[t]he body concerned shall be deemed to
have decided by consensus ... if no Member, present at the
meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the
proposed decision."' 40 If the matter cannot be decided through
consensus, Article IX also allows for voting in certain
circumstances. 14' For instance, accession of a new member to the
WTO requires a two-thirds majority. 142 However, because of the
politics and grouping of countries with similar interests at the
WTO, accession, like nearly all other matters, is effectively
accomplished by way of consensus since voting often occurs
through blocs. 143  Likewise, permissive interpretations of WTO
Agreements (as opposed to strict determinations) can only be
adopted by a three-fourths vote, effectively limiting the reach of
the agreements to the four comers of the approved document."
As a result of these restrictions placed upon the governing
body, the WTO operates almost exclusively on the basis of
138 See Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14.
139 WTO Agreement, supra note 99, art. IX:1.
140 Id. art. IX n.1.
141 Id. art. IX:1.
142 Id. arts. XII: 1 - 2.
143 AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATr &WTO 34-39 (2003).
144 MATSUSHITA ETAL., supra note 1, at 12.
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treaty. 145  The dispute resolution process, however, mixes both
custom and binding arbitration in sharp contrast to the consensus-
minded negotiating body. 146 Created by the WTO Agreement, the
WTO dispute resolution arm shares many similarities with a court
of international law: "there is compulsory jurisdiction, disputes are
settled largely by applying rules of law, decisions are binding on
the parties and sanctions may be imposed if decisions are not
observed."' 147 With more than eighty cases filed in the first two
years after its creation, and over 350 cases filed by late 2005, one
commentator indicates that "[t]his activity implies confidence in
the system and places political pressure on all states to comply,
because many, including the most important trading nations, are
both complainants and respondents in the various trade disputes
considered."'48  In fact, the WTO itself likens the increase in
dispute resolution claims to a "growing faith in the system," and
the fact that it is more effective to resolve disputes through this
process as opposed to "taking the law into their own hands."' 4 9
The current framework for the resolution of disputes was
codified in the 1995 WTO Agreement, through a connected
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes."'5 ° This agreement replaced the previous
framework imposed under the GATT of 1947. 15' Article XXIII of
the GATF created a process for resolving "nullification or
impairment" of the GATT, which occurred in three possible ways:
"(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its
obligations under this agreement, or (b) the application by another
contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with
the provisions of this Agreement, or (c) the existence of any other
situation."' 5 2 The GATT 1947 provided for a three-tier system of
145 Id.
146 Id. at 64.
147 Id. at 18.
148 Id. at 18; see also Disputes by Country, supra note 9.
149 WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes: A Unique Contribution,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis_e/tife/displ-e.htm (last visited Mar. 6,
2007) [hereinafter Settling Disputes].
150 See DSU, supra note 7.
151 Settling Disputes, supra note 149.
152 WTO, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXIII: I(a)-
[Vol. XXXII
WTO-CoTroN SUBSIDIES
resolution based on escalation, beginning with an open letter from
the concerned party describing the areas of concern and potential
remedies to the other contracting party or parties which must be
given "sympathetic consideration."'' 53 Should this action prove
inadequate, the matter is referred to the general body of
"Contracting Parties," which "shall promptly investigate any
matter so referred to them and shall make appropriate
recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to
be concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate."' 15 4 As
part of this process, the Contracting Parties can consult with
individual parties to the GATT or consult with other international
organizations, including the United Nations.'55
If the Contracting Parties' recommendations are not accepted,
or the dispute persists, the general body may then allow one of the
parties to suspend application of the Agreement towards the
offending party as a means of affecting a retaliatory
countermeasure. 15 6  The offending party then has an option to
withdraw from the GATT upon sixty days' notice.'57 Because of
its success, the GATT dispute resolution process became
formalized over time, adding layers over the minimalist provisions
of Article XXIII. '58 In many ways, the very nature of the GATT is
what held its dispute resolution process together-ignoring a
decision by the dispute resolution process would consequently
diminish the overall legal framework that underpinned the
GATT.5 9 As a result, the Contracting Parties have permitted the
suspension of concessions only once throughout the nearly 50
years of the GATT.
160
(c), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/gatt47_02 e.htm
[hereinafter GATF 1947]; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 19.
153 GATT 1947, supra note 152, art. XXII:1.
154 Id. art. XXIII:2.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 20 (describing at length the multiple
supplemental dispute resolution agreements entered into under GATT 1947).
159 Id. at 20-21.
160 Id. Ironically, the sanctions were authorized against the United States in 1952
for restrictions on dairy imports, one of the few U.S. agricultural products subject to
more government control and subsidization than cotton. Id.
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Although members respected the GATT process, it was not
without problems. In many ways, these problems were just as
attributable to the nature of the underlying agreement as its
successes. 16' The process was slow and panels often encountered
obstacles due to the high vote requirements required for panel
formation and recommendation acceptance. 162  In addition,
because of the high bar needed to secure acceptance of the panel
recommendations, the recommendations were largely ad hoc,
rather than based on consistent precedent, leading to a process that
was often far from predictable. 1
63
When framing the dispute resolution process for the new
WTO, the negotiating parties desired to adopt a system that would
resolve the obstacles posed by the more consensus-oriented GATT
process, but also keep Contracting Parties from either ignoring the
mandated resolution or leaving the WTO altogether."64 The
WTO's foundational agreement states that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided under this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade
Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions,
procedures and customary practices followed by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947 and the bodies
established in the framework of GATT 1947. " 165 The current
dispute resolution process should be viewed not as a re-writing of
the GATT's procedure, but rather as a fleshing out of the skeletal
process first articulated through the 1947 Agreement. 166
As created by the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU),
the current dispute settlement system consists of three major
bodies: the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), dispute panels, and
the Appellate Body. 167 The DSB has "the authority to establish
161 Id. at 21.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 22; see also Settling Disputes, supra
note 149.
165 WTO Agreement, supra note 99, art. XVI: 1.
166 In many ways, the WTO Agreement and its attached DSU can be viewed as a
consolidation and extension of a series of agreements; for example, provisions of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures compliment the DSU. See SCM,
supra note 122.
167 DSU, supra note 7, art. 2.1.
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panels, adopt panel and Appellate Body reports, maintain
surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations,
and authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations
under the covered agreements."'' 68 The DSB covers most of the
agreements attached to the WTO Agreement including the
Agreement on Agriculture. 169  Underneath this umbrella
organization are the panels themselves, which are composed of
"well-qualified governmental and/or non-governmental
individuals" who are generally trade experts with some
governmental or academic experience.'70 Initial panels are usually
composed of three members, but can include five panelists upon
mutual agreement of the parties.' 7'
In addition to the DSB and individual panels, the DSU also
creates an appellate body to review panel rulings.' The
Appellate Body is composed of seven individuals appointed to
four-year terms by the DSB.'73 Though only three members sit on
a review panel for any one case, all seven must make themselves
relatively familiar with all of the cases before the DSB. 174 Like
members of the initial panels, Appellate Body members are
required to have significant experience in the field of international
trade and must not be affiliated with any particular government. 175
The DSU also provides a more binding procedure for
evaluating the disputes themselves with agreed upon timeframes
for each phase. 176 Though all members of the WTO have agreed
to be bound by the DSU, the agreement states that a "[m]ember
shall exercise its judgment as to whether action in these
procedures would be fruitful.' ' 177 Instead, the DSU indicates that
the formal complaint initiating the dispute resolution process is a
168 d. art. 2.1.
169 Id. art. I(A).
170 Id. art. 8.1.
171 Id. art. 8.5.
172 Id. arts. 17.1 - 17.2
173 DSU, supra note 7, arts. 17.1 - 17.2.
174 Id. art. 17.1.
175 Id. art. 17.3.
176 Settling Disputes, supra note 149.
177 DSU, supra note 7, art. 3.7.
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"last resort" that may only be exercised should consultation with
the offending parties bear no fruit. 7 8 If the complaining party
initiates formal proceedings, the other concerned party or parties
must reply to the notification within 10 days and must "enter into
consultations in good faith" within the next 30 days. 7 9 Only if the
formal consultations180 fail to produce a settlement of the dispute
within 60 days can the parties push forward with the panel
process.18
Once the consultation period has expired, the complaining
party can request the formation of a panel by the DSB. 182 While
the responding party may be able to block the formation of the
panel initially, the panel must be established at the next DSB
unless there is a unanimous vote against the creation. 183 This last
provision is a critical addition to the new DSU that addresses the
difficulty many countries faced when they attempted to move a
dispute into a more formal resolution process under the GATT
1947 procedures.184 While the panel process is a formal arbitration
proceeding, it is still flexible enough to allow for the resolution of
related disputes.'8" For example, a single panel can consider
multiple complaints of the same type against the same offending
party or parties, as well as the concerns of related third parties that
might be affected by either the dispute or its resolution.'86
During the panel process itself, the complaining party has the
burden of proof to demonstrate the offending nation's lack of
compliance with its particular WTO commitments. 187 For
178 Id. art. 3.7.
179 Id. art. 4.3.
180 Settling Disputes, supra note 149. These formal consultations can involve
formal mediation from the WTO director-general. Id.
181 DSU, supra note 7, art. 4.7.
182 Id. arts. 4.7 - 4.8.
183 Id. art. 6. 1; see also Settling Disputes, supra note 149.
184 Cf. MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 21 (describing the procedural obstacles
to instituting the formal dispute resolution process under the GATT 1947).
185 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 28.
186 DSU, supra note 7, arts. 9.1, 10.2; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at
28.
187 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 38 (citing U the formal dispute resolution
process under the GATT 1947).
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example, the panel in United States-Shirts and Blouses held that
when the complaining nation establishes that the offending party
has violated the agreement, the offending nation then has the
burden of proving that the "challenging party['s] [claim] is not
based on an appropriate ground."'' 88 In short, the "party which
makes an affirmative claim, whether it is the complaining party or
the defending party, bears the burden of proof."'
189
This is not to say, however, that the dispute panel's process is
entirely equivalent to familiar notions of judicial process in the
United States. Instead, the panel is merely a device to help the
DSB come to agreement about its binding action. Under the DSU,
the function of the panel is "to assist the DSB in discharging its
responsibilities under this understanding and the covered
agreements.' ' 90 But, just as the DSU requires consensus to block
the formation of a panel, it also requires a consensus of the DSB to
block adoption of the panel's findings within 60 days of
circulation to member countries. 19' Any party (excluding
appurtenant third parties) to a dispute can appeal the panel's report
to the Appellate Body. 192
Like appellate proceedings in the United States, the Appellate
Body's ruling is "limited to issues of law covered in the panel
report and legal interpretations developed by the panel."' 93 The
Appellate Body need not exercise strict judicial economy-the
DSU states that the Appellate Body must "address each of the
issues raised in accordance with paragraph 6 during the appellate
proceeding."' 94  The Appellate Body can "uphold, modify, or
187 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 28.
187 DSU, supra note 7, art. 9.1, 10.2; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at
28.
188 Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 1 38, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997)
[hereinafter United States-Shirts and Blouses]).
189 Id. 139.
190 DSU, supra note 7, art. 11.
191 Id. art. 16.4.; see also Settling Disputes, supra note 149. This too is a substantial
change reflecting efforts to improve the dispute resolution system from the foundations
of the GATT 1947. Id.
192 DSU, supra note 7, art. 17.4.
193 Id. art. 17.6.
194 Id. art. 17.12.
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reverse" 195 the panel's recommendation within 60 to 90 days of the
appeal 196 provided its ruling addresses every legal issue raised in
the proceeding, regardless of whether it is relevant to the
dispute.' 97 It bases its decision on an "objective assessment" of the
facts before it, 98 but is allowed substantial deference to conduct its
own fact-finding and investigation.'99 In some ways, while the
Appellate Body is limited to issues of law, rather than of fact, 200 its
decision takes on aspects of a de novo proceeding as well.20' Once
the Appellate Body has made its recommendation, the DSB and
the involved parties must accept the report within 30 days unless
there is a consensus vote to reject the recommendation.2 2
Following the exhaustion of the formal resolution process and
the adoption of the Appellate Body's recommendation by the
DSB, the focus of the process turns to correcting the breach of the
Agreement-"[t]he priority at this stage is for the losing
'defendant' to bring its policy into line with the ruling or
recommendations. 2 3 Within 30 days of the adoption of the panel
or Appellate Body's report by the DSB, the offending party must
make its intentions known to the DSB as to whether it plans to
comply with the ruling.2 04 Should it be impracticable for the
offending party to adjust its policies to comply with the DSB
ruling, the Member will have a "reasonable" amount of time in
which to make the necessary adjustments.2 5
195 Id. art. 17.3.
196 Id. art. 17.5
197 Id. art. 17.12.
198 DSU, supra note 7, art. 11.
199 Id. art. 13.
200 Id. art. 17.6.
201 Id. art. 17.13.
202 Id. art. 17.14. (allowing members to express their views in the report, perhaps as
a type of "dissenting opinion.").
203 Settling Disputes, supra note 149.
204 Id. art. 21.3.
205 Id. art. 21.3. Per this Article of the Agreement, "reasonable" is defined in three
ways: a) the period of time proposed by the offending party; b) a period of time
mutually agreed to by the parties within 45 days of the decision of the DSB; or c) a
period of time decided by binding arbitration before the panel. Id. In the present cotton
dispute, decided in March 2005, the United States is still awaiting Congressional action
to make statutory changes to affect the appropriate remedy. See discussion infra Part
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Though the DSU provides a stronger and more regimented
basis for resolving disputes, some argue that the DSU's
enforcement of DSB rulings is less than rigorous. Because there is
little guidance to the losing party as to specific actions needed to
effect compliance with the ruling, the losing party often "take[s]
minimal steps and declare[s] itself in full compliance. 2 °6 If the
complaining party disagrees, or if the losing party fails to meet the
expectations of the complaining party with regards to its response,
what has really been gained through the added formalism of the
dispute process? The WTO has partially addressed this problem
by referring the matter to a compliance panel created under the
DSU.20 7 Also, the DSU permits the complaining party to request
permission from the DSB to retaliate against the offending party
within 20 days of the expiration of the "reasonable" period
provided under Article 21.3.2°8
In addition, the DSB can specify sanctions against the
offending party in its own stead. 209 The two options available are
compensation and retaliation.21 °  Compensation requires the
offending nation to compensate the complaining nation, usually in
the form of additional trade concessions which are of equivalent
value to those initially mandated as part of the DSB's settlement
ruling.2 'I The DSB also can authorize the complaining nation to
retaliate against the offending nation through a suspension of
concessions against the offending party. 21 2 Retaliation measures
authorized by the DSB remain under the supervision of the DSB at
all times.2 3 The goal of such measures is to force the offending
IV.C.
206 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 30.
207 Id. at 30-31; see also DSU, supra note 7, art. 21.5.
208 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22.2.
209 Id. art. 22; see also MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 32; Settling Disputes,
supra note 149.
210 DSU, supra note 7, art. 22; MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
211 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 32.
212 Id. at 33. Moreover, Article 22.3 details three options for retaliation: 1) parallel
retaliation against the offending nation on the same sectors subject to the earlier dispute;
2) retaliation against different sectors, but still those covered by the same Agreement;
and 3) retaliation against the complaining party across agreements. DSU, supra note 7,
art. 22.3(a)-(c).
213 DSU, supra note 7, arts. 22.4 - 22.8.
2007]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
nation to comply with its commitments under the foundational
WTO Agreement or have the offending nation face an equivalent
level of "impairment or nullification. 214
Despite the advances in the dispute resolution process made
through the 1994 Agreement, many developing countries still seek
reform of the process through the ongoing Doha Round of WTO
negotiations.2 15 While the DSU is credited with "eliminat[ing] or
substantially reduc[ing] the harassment of developing countries
arising out of the operation of the rules," some developing
countries are afraid that developed countries will use any effort to
make the dispute resolution process more streamlined and binding
as a trade-off for reforming subsidies and other trade distorting
activities.216
In contrast, some commentators believe that while the DSB is
undeniably a judicial entity, it has sometimes crossed the line from
interpreting the law to making law through its decisions.1 7 This
trend becomes more problematic as the politically-accountable
sections of the WTO, the General Council and the Ministerial
Conference, rarely move to check the DSB.218 In addition, panels'
greater consideration of precedent and custom in formulating their
decisions makes the influence of the DSB, in many ways, even
more pervasive than that of the General Council, as their decisions
become immediately part of agreements that often take decades to
fully negotiate and implement.21 9 According to one expert source:
Tribunals choose to follow previous cases not only for reasons
of fairness and legitimacy, but also for reasons of efficiency.
Today's tribunal benefits from the work done yesterday on the
same legal question; the wheel does not have to be reinvented.
Finally, following precedent tends to make the law clearer and
more certain, which is also of benefit to the legal system.2
214 Id.
215 See generally BHAGIRATH LAL DAS, WTO: THE DOHA AGENDA: THE NEW
NEGOTIATIONS ON WORLD TRADE 54-55 (2003).
216 Id.
217 MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 43.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 25 (describing the use of prior DSB rulings and reasoning on future
cases addressed by initial panels or the Appellate Body).
220 Id. at 59.
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With the increasing use of the dispute resolution system, the DSB
will likely only grow in importance in not just settling disputes,
but also making law to fill in the gaps of the broader underlying
WTO Agreement. 22' In order to examine the potential impacts of a
broader role taken by the DSB, the next section briefly examines
the United States' record in the DSB.
B. The United States and Its History in the Dispute
Resolution Body
The United States has been involved as either a complaining or
responding party in nearly 180 separate disputes, constituting over
half of the total formal disputes brought before the DSB since its
inception in 1995.222 The United States has appeared as the
complaining party 84 times and as the responding party 97 times
to date.223 Of disputes that have been filed by the United States
and have completed consideration, the United States' record is
impressive-24 cases have been resolved to the U.S.'s satisfaction
without completing litigation, 24 have seen the United States win
on the core issue of the complaint, and there have been only 4
losses on the core issue.224  In addition, 14 cases are still
outstanding, awaiting further consideration by the DSB.225
In contrast, the United States' record as responding party is
much less successful, with the United States losing the core issue
of the dispute on 26 occasions, compared with only 13 wins.226
Nearly half of the cases brought against the United States involve
either textiles or agricultural products.2 27 Though many cases
involve developed countries, a significant number of successful
221 The outcome of United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton demonstrates the
growing power of the DSB to interpret critical areas of the larger W'TO Agreement.
222 See WTO, Dispute Settlement, The Disputes: Disputes by Country, supra note 9.
223 Id.
224 VVTO, Office of the US Trade Rep., Snapshot of WTO Cases Involving the
United States [hereinafter Snapshot], http://www.ustr.gov (highlight "trade agreements,"
use drop down menu and click on "global," click on "monitoring and enforcement,"
click on "WTO Dispute Settlement," then click "Snapshot of WTO Cases involving the
U.S.") (describing the cases in more detail).
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Id.
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cases were brought by developing countries or emerging
economies, such as Brazil and India.228
Looking over the United States' involvement in the dispute
resolution process, several points are at least hinted at in the
numbers. First, the mandated preliminary consultation before the
complainant goes to panel seems to precipitate resolution of
229 th rdisputes between both countries. Of the roughly 180 cases
involving the United States, almost one-quarter have been
resolved without completing the litigation. 230 And while many of
the cases involve the United States in dispute with another major
developed country, there seems to be little reluctance on the part
of either the developing world or the United States to pursue
disputes against one another. 231  For instance, the United States
pursued litigation against Venezuela, Argentina, India, and Brazil;
all of these same countries plus regional allies, such as Costa Rica
and Pakistan, filed claims against the United States as well.232
From these results, it appears that most WTO members put
significant faith in the dispute resolution process, as noted by the
breadth and scope of the complaints brought against the United
States.233 There does seem to be an advantage to the complaining
party within the process-the United States has fared far better as
a complaining party in resolving its complaints than as the
responding party.2 34  As one commentator stated, "[s]ince
complainants win the vast majority of cases in which they are
involved, it is expected that complainants will continue to bring
disputes to the WTO.' 23 5
On the other hand, where the disputes require the panel to
228 Id. In addition to the developing countries noted above, the United States seems
to have had a contentious relationship with its NAFrA partners regarding agricultural
issues. Id. Further, the list is littered with litigation that followed the President's
decision to raise protective tariffs on steel imports in 2001. Id.
229 Id.
230 Snapshot, supra note 224.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Sue Mota, The World Trade Organization: An Analysis of Disputes, 25 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 75, 104 (1999).
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interpret differing interpretations of the WTO Agreement or its
appurtenant parts, the cases should intuitively be much closer.
However, even if the margin for addressing these issues is less
than the nearly 80% success rate that complaining parties once
reported,236 the power of the DSB within the WTO framework to
make immediate rulings coupled with the weight of the rulings as
customary international law would argue for a DSB that has no
decided slant to either the complaining or responding party.
Otherwise, the dispute resolution process would become the key
avenue for gaining and enforcing concessions, rather than through
the normal negotiation process.
With the current Doha Round of negotiations at an impasse, it
is possible that the dispute resolution process has already begun to
perform the primary function of the General Council and the
Ministerial Conference. Examining United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton in some detail may shed more light on this subject.
IV. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton
A. Background
Following Brazil's filing of a formal complaint in 2002 to
begin the formal proceedings in the upland cotton dispute,
numerous outside groups recognized its importance as a
bellwether for the future of WTO agriculture negotiations. For
example, the British non-governmental organization (NGO)
Oxfam made the link between the cotton dispute and the
agriculture talks more generally, asserting that fixing U.S. cotton
subsidies should be but a part of a larger reform that eliminates all
export subsidies as well as a radical reformation of green box
subsidies.2 37 In contrast, following Brazil's complaint in 2002, the
National Cotton Council, the largest organization of cotton
producers in the United States, responded by describing Brazil's
actions as a distraction from the larger goal of a new round of
trade negotiations.238 In 2003, the Chairman of the National
236 Id.
237 Kevin Watkins, Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of U.S. Cotton Subsidies on
Africa, at 4 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 30, 2002)
238 Press Release, National Cotton Council, NCC: Brazil's Complaints on U.S.
Cotton Programs Unwarranted, Oct. 2, 2002, http://www.cotton.org/news/releases/2002/
20071
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Cotton Council sharply rejected the claims of those who brought
the cotton complaint:
The perception being fostered by several self-serving
international organizations-that U.S. agricultural policies drive
the world agricultural economy-is simply ludicrous .... The
attempt to blame the ills of the world's developing countries on
the U.S. cotton program is naive, at best. It is based on seriously
flawed economics. It is misleading the leaders of many African
countries. It ignores the substantial trade preferences the United
States provides to African countries to enable them to develop
their textile and apparel processing industries.239
The different motivations of the complaining parties
complicates the dispute. Brazil is one of the rising producers of
cotton in the world, and a growing competitor in the global cotton
market.24 ° In contrast, the western African nations of Benin, Chad,
Mali, and Burkina Faso, of which Benin and Chad supported
Brazil's claims, are unlikely to be a force in the global cotton
market in the near future.24' West Africa cumulatively produces
roughly 17% of the world's cotton.242 Cotton, however, provides
for 50-80% of their total exports, and serves as the livelihood of
nearly nine million of their citizens.243 In addition, one estimate
indicates that U.S. subsidies for cotton depress world cotton prices
by nearly 10%, creating income losses for West African farmers of
nearly $250 million annually.2" So while the cotton dispute is, at
its essence, an economic dispute, there is a disparate impact and
interest between the complaining parties.
The United States cannot fairly be accused of being blind to
the nature of the subsistence farming in sub-Saharan Africa.
Congress overwhelmingly passed the African Growth and
Brazil-WTO.cfm.
239 Press Release, National Cotton Council, NCC Supportive of Progressive Trade
Policy; Concerned With Division Within World Trade Organization, June 18, 2003,
http://www.cotton.orglnews/releasesl2003/Greene-trade-testimony.cfm.
240 See World Markets and Trade, supra note 23.
241 ACTIONAID, THE COTrON DISPUTE: A VICTORY FOR THE WORLD'S POOR FARMERS
(June 17, 2004).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 DOHA Agenda, supra note I1, at 17-18.
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Opportunity Act (AGOA), 245  which "provides beneficiary
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with the most liberal access to the
U.S. market available to any country with which [the United
States] do[es] not have a Free Trade Agreement. 2 46  This
legislation provides duty and quota free treatment of certain
apparel articles imported from the 37 certified Sub-Saharan
African nations.247 Additionally, AGOA and its progeny create
and extend the so-called "third country fabric provision," which
creates an incentive for AGOA nations to not only produce their
own apparel, but also weave and dye their own fabric.2 48 AGOA
of 2000 was expanded and clarified by the AGOA Acceleration
Act of 2004.249 This act was passed largely because of the pending
expiration of the third country fabric rule ° Since the passage of
AGOA, U.S. non-oil imports from the region are up 22% to nearly
$3.5 billion annually.251
Finally, outside of the shrewd economic dealing inherent
within the WTO is the even shrewder political dealing surrounding
trade battles in the individual countries. For example, in Brazil,
the newly elected President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, criticized
the incumbent government for failing to pursue a more aggressive
strategy at the WTO against the United States during his election
campaign. Following his nation's panel victory, Lula stated that
"[t]his beautiful victory at the WTO will allow us to take a leap in
quality, especially in the cotton producing states [;w]e have to
show [the United States and the EC] that we are as competent as
245 African Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000, 19 U.S.C. § 3701 (2000).
246 African Growth and Opportunity Act: Frequently Asked Questions, Q: How
Does AGOA Benefit African Countries?, http://www.agoa.gov/faq/faq.htm (last visited
Mar. 10, 2007).
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3701 (West 2005).
250 150 CONG. REc. H3875, 3884-87 (daily ed. June 14, 2004) (statement of U.S.
House Committee on Ways and Means Chairman Bill Thomas).
251 OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, TRADE FACTS: U.S.-AFRICA TRADE IS
UP: NON-OIL AGOA TRADE EXPANDS (Mar. 8, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
DocumentLibrary/Fact Sheets/2005/asset-uploadfile792_7354.pdf.
252 Brazil's Lula Hails "Beautiful Victory" over USA on Cotton Subsidies, FIN.
TIMES, May 2, 2004.
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they are., 25 3  The United States was not immune to political
pressures, either. In 2002, in the midst of important mid-term
elections, Congress, with the support of the President, passed the
2002 Farm Bill, which greatly expanded subsidies and commodity
payments for agricultural commodities, including cotton. 54 Upon
signing the bill, President Bush stated:
My administration is working hard to open up markets. I told
the people, I said if you give me a chance to be the President,
we're not going to treat our agriculture industry as a secondary
citizen when it comes to opening up markets. And I mean that.
I understand how important the farm economy is to the future of
our country. To help, this new law helps keep our international
trade commitments. And that's important for America to
understand. 5
In short, agriculture and its competitiveness in the global
marketplace is not just an economic or legal issue, but also a
political issue for policy-makers to struggle with through often
dicey negotiations and elections. Without a doubt, the rhetoric of
all parties before and during the dispute is perhaps more
illustrative of their real motivations than their legal arguments
during litigation of the dispute itself.
B. The Case Itself
On September 27, 2002, Brazil initiated the WTO dispute
resolution process by requesting formal consultations with the
DSB and the United States in regards to certain U.S. subsidies for
domestic production of upland cotton. 6 Within its initial request
for consultation, Brazil, which was later joined by several other
nations as third parties to the dispute, 257 broadly attacked the entire
253 Id.
254 See MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 141.
255 Press Release, White House, President Signs Farm Bill: Remarks by the
President Upon Signing the Farm Bill (Mar. 13, 2002),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020513-2.html. Cf. DSU, supra
note 7, art. 17.3 (stating the producers' response to Brazil's initiation of the formal
dispute process).
256 Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/DS267/1 (Sept. 27, 2002) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by Brazil].
257 Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS267, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm.
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structure of USDA commodity programs for cotton from 1999 to
2002, as well as the 2002 Farm Bill.258 First, Brazil targeted the
Step-2, Step-3, and SCGP programs as export subsidies barred
under Article 9(2)(b)(iv) of the Agriculture Agreement. 259 Next,
Brazil challenged current LDP and counter-cyclical payments as
exceeding AMS caps and "amber box" limitations for payments
that are linked to market prices.26°  Finally, Brazil took the bold
move of challenging new "green box" commodity programs
approved in the 2002 Farm Bill, including new conservation
programs, direct payments, and even drought and disaster relief
payments approved by Congress from 1998 to 2001.261 In many
ways, Brazil's initial request for consultation attacked not just U.S.
cotton subsidies, but the United States' current level of commodity
support more generally, as many of the claims apply equally to all
U.S. commodities.262
Following the failure of the consultation process, Brazil then
requested that the DSB create a panel to begin consideration of the
dispute on February 6, 2003.263 The DSB initially deferred
creation of the Panel under Article 6.1 of the DSU, 264 but was
Argentina, Australia, Benin, Canada, Chad, China, Taiwan, the European Union, India,
New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Venezuela, Japan, and Thailand were all joined as
third parties to the dispute. Id.
258 Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 256.
259 Id. at 2; see also Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, annex 2; U.S. Farm
Policy, supra note 99 (describing Article 9's provisions limiting export subsidies for
developed and developing countries).
260 Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 256, at 1-2; see also discussion
supra Part II.C (describing what constitutes amber box payments under the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture).
261 Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 256, at 1-2; see also
MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 1, at 137 n. 158 (describing green box subsidies under the
WTO Agriculture Agreement).
262 Request for Consultations by Brazil, supra note 256. In particular, Brazil's
arguement that 2002 Farm Bill amendments to LDP rates and direct payment rates, as
well as the creation of the counter-cyclical payment program, moved U.S. AMS beyond
its permitted level, by definition, assumes that aggregate support has increased. Id.
Though the claim's scope was limited to cotton, it is possible that the supposed
improvements to the 2002 Farm Bill were at least a precipitant of the timing of the claim.
263 Dispute Settlement: DS 267, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds267_e.htm
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement: DS 267].
264 Id.; see also DSU, supra note 7.
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forced to create the panel following a second request by Brazil on
March 18, 2003.265 In initial arguments before the panel in July
2003, as well as its eventual arguments before the Appellate Body
in October 2004, Brazil made five distinct claims against the
United States, 266 each of which are described in turn below,
followed by the DSB finding.
First, Brazil claimed that the United States was no longer
exempt from the "peace clause" provisions of Article 13 of the
Agriculture Agreement because its domestic and export subsidies
exceeded its WTO commitments.267 Article 13 prohibits parties to
the Agreement from challenging domestic support measures so
long as the level of support for a commodity remains at or below
agreed upon levels in the Agriculture Agreement. 268 Brazil made
two arguments: first, that U.S. cotton programs were subject to
Article 13 of the Agriculture Agreement, and second, that current
levels of U.S. support were larger in the 2001 marketing year than
they were in the 1992 marketing year.269 In response, the United
States argued that the peace clause was still "'exempt from
actions"' and that "Brazil may not bring or maintain any action
against such measures 'based on"' the baseline 1992 Marketing
Year codified in Article 13.270 The Panel concluded, and the
Appellate Body affirmed, that Brazil sufficiently demonstrated
that the United States' current commodity support was in excess of
that from the 1992 Marketing Year, and thus was no longer
protected by the peace clause.27'
Next, Brazil claimed that direct payments under the 2002 Farm
Bill, and the Production Flexibility payments made under the 1996
Farm Bill, failed to comply with the criteria listed under Annex 2
of the Agriculture Agreement for green box subsidies.272 Brazil
265 Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 263.
266 Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept.
8, 2004) [hereinafter Cotton Panel Report].
267 Id. at 2-3.
268 Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, article 13(b)(ii).
269 See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.354 - 7.355.
270 Id. 7.339.
271 Id. 7.608; Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14, 384.
272 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.1(i); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 1 363.
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argued that these payments should count against the United States'
support limit as measured by the 1992 Marketing Year for
purposes of the peace clause. 27 3  The United States argued that
both of the direct payment programs were green box subsidies, as
they were not tied to market price or other limits. 274 The panel
found, and the Appellate Body affirmed, that because direct
payments to producers were contingent upon U.S. producers not
planting certain program crops, the direct payments did not qualify
as green box subsidies.275
In its third claim, Brazil argued that the Step-2 program
functioned as a prohibited export subsidy and was barred under
current U.S. commitments to the WTO. 276  The United States
argued that Step-2 payments are better characterized as part of its
amber box domestic support program, because they are provided
to domestic users as well as exporters, and are subject to
"reduction commitments under Article 6" of the Agriculture
Agreement. 277 However, the panel held, and the Appellate Body
affirmed, that payments to exporters under the Step-2 program
were "export contingent," and were therefore inconsistent with
U.S. commitments under the Agriculture Agreement.278  In
reaching this decision the full precedential and customary weight
of previous Appellate Body proceedings was brought to bear, as
the Appellate Body relied on reasoning first stated in US-Foreign
Sales Corporations27 9 to determine the contingency of U.S.
273 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.2; Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 363.
274 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.5-.6; Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 16-18.
275 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8.1(c); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 341-42.
276 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3. 1(ii); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 9V 526-28. See generally discussion, supra Part II.B (describing the Step-
2 cotton program as payments to U.S. exporters and domestic mill users to compensate
them for their purchase of higher priced U.S. cotton).
277 Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14, 48; see also Cotton Panel
Report, supra note 266, 3.5; Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14, 47-55.
278 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8.1(e)-(f); Appellate Body Cotton
Report, supra note 14, IT 582-84.
279 Panel Report, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations--
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the European Communities, WT/DS108/RW, Jan.
14, 2002 (adopted Jan. 29, 2002).
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payments to exporters.28 °
In its fourth claim, Brazil argued that U.S. export guarantee
programs, such as GSM-102, GSM-103, 28' and the Supplier Credit
Guarantee Program (SCGP),282 violated the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture.283 These export guarantee programs apply to nearly
all U.S. agricultural products.284  These programs further
demonstrate Brazil's intent to seek concessions on all aspects of
U.S. commodity programs through its complaint. In response, the
United States simply attempted to contradict the Brazilian
assertions, and then argued the point largely on procedural, rather
than substantive, grounds. 285 These arguments were not especially
persuasive to either the panel or the Appellate Body, which both
held that the export guarantee programs did violate the United
States' commitments under the Agriculture Agreement.286
In its fifth and final claim, Brazil argued that the subsidies
provided to U.S. cotton growers "suppressed upland cotton prices
in the U.S., world [,] and Brazilian markets," primarily during the
1999-2002 marketing years, which resulted in an increase in the
U.S. share of the world cotton market beyond its "equitable
share. 2 87 In response, the United States argued that its payments
280 See generally Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14, In 578-81.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 57-60 (describing the GSM 102/103
programs in greater detail).
282 See Export Credit Programs, supra notes 57.
283 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.1(iii); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 590; Agriculture Agreement supra note 89, art. 10.1 (stating that
"[e]xport subsidies not listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9 shall not be applied in a manner
which results in, or which threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy
commitments; nor shall non-commercial transactions be used to circumvent such
commitments").
284 See generally Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266.
285 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.5; Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, IN 56-57, 62-69. In terms of its procedural arguments, the United States
argues that Brazil inadequately raised the issue of export guarantees during the
consultation phase, and is subsequently blocked from raising these issues before the
panel or Appellate Body. Noting the composition of the programs, it is clear that little
persuasive ground was available to the U.S.'s WTO delegation on this issue.
286 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8.1(d); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, U 609-11; see also WTO Agriculture Agreement, supra note 89, art.
10.1.
287 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.1(vi)-(viii); Appellate Body Report,
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were in full compliance with its obligations under the Agriculture
Agreement.288 Moreover, the United States contended that the
surge in exports was not due to an increase in subsidies, but to a
fall in domestic textile consumption.289
In their findings, the panel and the Appellate Body agreed that
U.S. domestic support measures that were directly contingent on
market price levels (including the Step-2 program and the GSM-
102 and GSM-103 export guarantee programs) suppressed market
prices from 1999 to 2002, which resulted in "serious prejudice"
against Brazil. 29" However, both panels declined to include U.S.
direct payments and other green box subsidies as a cause of
serious prejudice.29  As a response, the panel, as affirmed by the
Appellate Body, required the United States to withdraw "without
delay" the specified export subsidy and Step-2 payments to
prevent further prejudice. 2
Following the adoption of the final Appellate Body report on
March 21, 2005, the United States was required to take remedial
actions on two tiers.293  First, the panel recommended that the
United States withdraw those support programs identified as
prohibited subsidies by July 1, 2005.294 The prohibited subsidies
earmarked for withdrawal were export credit guarantees under
GSM-102 and GSM-103, and SCGP as they apply to cotton, rice,
and other crops subject to USDA commodity programs.295
Further, the panel report, as affirmed by the Appellate Body, also
required the immediate withdrawal of Step-2 payments to
exporters of U.S. cotton as well as Step-2 payments that assist
supra note 14, V 94-96.
288 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 3.6; Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 173-76.
289 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.1336.
290 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8.1 (g)(i); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 763(c)(1)-(2).
291 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8. 1(g)(ii); Appellate Body Cotton Report,
supra note 14, 11 763(c)(1)-(2).
292 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.1500-7.1503, 8.3(b).
293 Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 263.
294 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 8.3.
295 Id. 7.1502.
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domestic users of cotton.296
In addition, the panel's report, as affirmed by the Appellate
Body, also made recommendations on subsidies deemed
"actionable" as contributing serious prejudice to the interests of
Brazil during the 1999 to 2002 marketing years.297 Specifically,
the panel stated that the United States was "obliged to take action
concerning its present statutory and regulatory framework as a
result of our 'present' serious prejudice finding., 298 The programs
affected by this ruling were those directly linked to price, such as
the counter-cyclical payments, LDPs, and the Step-2 program. 299
While these programs were deemed actionable by the panel's
report, the final recommendation was contingent on U.S.
withdrawal of the prohibited export subsidies detailed above.300
The panel report states:
We consider that, upon required implementation by the United
States of this Panel's prohibited subsidy findings and present
serious prejudice findings, the basket of measures in question
may be so significantly transformed or manifestly different from
the measures that are currently in question that it is not
necessary or appropriate to address Brazil's claims of threat of
serious prejudice .... 301
Despite its expansive findings of wrongdoing on the part of
U.S. commodity programs and export subsidies, the panel report
ultimately adopted by the DSB limits its proscriptive force to
relatively minor programs-the export subsidies of GSM-102,
GSM-103, and SCGP, as well as the Step-2 program as it applies
to domestic users and exporters of U.S. produced cotton.30 2 While
the programs required to take immediate action were relatively
few, it is equally important to note that of the four prohibited
programs, only one, the Step-2 program, is specific to cotton. The
other export credit programs are available to all U.S. commodities
296 Id. T 7.1502.
297 Id. 7.1499.
298 Id. 7.1501.
299 Id. 1 8.1 (g)(i).
300 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.1503.
301 Id. 7.1503.
302 Id. H 7.1502, 8.1(g)(i), 8.3.
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scheduled for export.30 3 Because the withdrawal of the Step-2
payments and reform of the export guarantee programs might
eliminate the harm, the panel recommended only that amber box
subsidy payments be curtailed or cut to remove their potential
adverse impact on the market.3" Unfortunately, current
enforcement efforts continue to stall over the classification of
these price-driven subsidy payments.3 5
C. Compliance Action and United States Response
In accordance with the DSB process, the United States stated
its intention to comply with the DSB findings at a special DSB
meeting on April 20, 2005.306 The United States indicated that it
respected the finding, but would require a "reasonable period of
time" to fully implement its response to panel recommendations.3 7
Currently, enforcement efforts are in flux as Brazil continues to
increase political and legal pressure within the WTO to encourage
U.S. compliance on the matter of its actionable amber box
subsidies.30 8
Domestically, the legal effect of the DSB findings is
comprehensively addressed in the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act (URAA), which was approved by Congress in 1994 to
implement the formation of the WTO. 3°  Among its many
provisions, URAA provides that "no provision of any of the
Uruguay Round Agreements, nor the application of any such
provision to any person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with
any law of the United States shall have effect."3'10 Further, the
URAA provides that nothing in the statute "shall be construed...
to amend or modify any law of the United States ... or... to limit
any authority conferred under any law of the United States...
303 See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266 (describing the Step-2 program); see
also .supra text accompanying notes 52 & 57 (describing the GSM 102/103 and SCGP).
304 Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.1503.
305 Dispute Settlement: DS 267, supra note 263.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Uruguay Round Trade Agreements Act of 1994, 19 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
310 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a)(1) (2000).
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unless specifically provided for in this Act."31' The strictness of
this statutory language is emphasized in the report language that
accompanied the bills:
Since the Uruguay Round agreements as approved by the
Congress, or any subsequent amendments to those agreements,
are not self-executing, any dispute settlement findings that a
U.S. statute is inconsistent with an agreement also cannot be
implemented except by legislation approved by the Congress
unless consistent implementation is permissible under the terms
of the statute.312
In short, any alteration of a U.S. statute needed to conform with a
WTO or DSB finding must come from Congress. There is no
automatic amendment in order to comply with changes in the
WTO.313 Similar provisions also apply to regulatory proceedings
that might not comport with WTO cases.314
To this end, United States. Secretary of Agriculture Mike
Johanns sent a package of proposed statutory reforms to Congress
for consideration in July 2005.3'5 Included in this package was a
repeal of the Step-2 Cotton program and the termination of the
GSM-103 Intermediate Export Guarantee Program.316 Secretary
Johanns also announced that the USDA would begin using a risk-
based fee structure for its GSM-102 and SCGP credit programs
using its designated regulatory powers to ensure compliance with
the WTO ruling.317 This package was designed to eliminate any
subsidies found to be per se prohibited under the Appellate Body
Report.318
311 Id. § (a)(2).
312 H.R. REP. No. 103-826 (I) at 25 (1994).
313 Id.
314 See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (2005).
315 Press Release, US Department of Agriculture Proposes Legislative Changes to
Cotton and Export Credit Programs to Comply with WTO Findings, July 5, 2005,
www.usda.gov (follow "Newsroom" hyperlink, then follow "Latest Releases" hyperlink,
select from dropdown menu "July 2005;" select release dated "July 5, 2005."
316 Id.
317 Id; see also Press Release, USDA Announces Changes to Export Credit
Guarantee Programs to Comply with WTO Findings, June 30, 2005, www.usda.gov
(follow "Newsroom" hyperlink, then follow "Latest Releases" hyperlink, select from
dropdown menu "June 2005;" select release dated "June 30, 2005."
318 Id.
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Much of Johanns's proposal was included as part of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, which was signed into law by President
Bush in February 2006.19 This measure, which was loaded with
controversial legislative riders unrelated to the cotton program,
eliminated the Step-2 Cotton Program on August 1, 2006.320
Though this immediate fix to the cotton program was rapidly
completed, the larger issue of comprehensive aggregate
commodity support raised-and only ambiguously answered-by
the Appellate Body report, still looms over Congress and the
nation's agricultural community. As indicated by Mark Lange, the
President of the National Cotton Council, the nation's largest
cotton producer group:
[c]ertain aspects of the decision have brought on a heightened
level of attention to [deliberations concerning the full
implementation of the Appellate Body decision] by the U.S.
agricultural community. This degree of concern could intensify
as we move further down the path of compliance and, through
the arbitration procedure, discover more about the longer term
impact stemming from some of the Panel's relatively vague
findings.32'
Lange also indicated that before the Appellate Body Report,
USDA, and Congress "believed that as long as a country complied
with the specific URAA provisions, that country would be exempt
from [SCM] challenges. The Panel's decision in the Brazil case
has changed this view. 322 Finally, Lange asserted that use of the
SCM standard of "serious prejudice" could be "distilled to 1) the
U.S. annually accounts for about 19% of the world's cotton
production, and 2) the United States has trade distorting subsidies.
Therefore, the United States must have committed serious
prejudice to Brazil's cotton interests. 323
Industry concerns were heightened as Brazil moved
procedurally to preserve its rights to enact unilateral retaliation
against the United States if Congress refused to curtail the
319 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 1103, 120 Stat. 5 (2006).
320 Id.
321 Mark Lange, Brazil Cotton Case and the WTO, http://www.cotton.org/issues/
2005/langereptica.cfm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
322 Id.
323 Id.
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actionable "amber box" subsidies in a timely fashion.324
Following the suspension of the Doha Round talks in July 2006,
Brazil requested that the compliance matter be returned to the
original panel for consideration.3 25 Brazil made a second request
to form a panel on September 28, 2006, and the DSB agreed to
forward the dispute to the original panel for consideration of U.S.
compliance measures.326 Though Brazil is ratcheting up pressure
on the U.S. government to modify certain actionable subsidies,
Brazil is still far from actually securing the right to retaliate
against the United States.327  Because the Panel may delay its
finding well beyond the 90 days normally allotted for compliance
proceedings, there is likely sufficient time for Congress to make
adjustments to farm programs to avoid as much as $4 billion in
retaliatory measures from Brazil.3 28
With the 2002 Farm Bill set to expire at the end of the 2007
crop year, the stage has been set for intense debate over the future
of U.S. farm programs more generally. The question will be:
Should Congress enact comprehensive cuts in its farm subsidies in
order to comply with the unclear mandate of the Appellate Body's
report? Even before the midterm elections of November 2006, the
outgoing chairman of the United States Senate Committee on
Agriculture, United States Senator Saxby Chambliss (R-GA),
indicated that he wanted to include measures in the next farm bill
that would protect farmers from future challenges to commodity
programs like that raised by Brazil.329
Already, the Bush Administration and some Members of
Congress have moved to cut farm subsidies outside of the usual
consideration of a five-year Farm Bill. In particular, United States
Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) renewed his effort to impose a
$250,000 per individual cap on farm program payments through
an amendment to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 Agriculture
324 Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Brazil, United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/30 (Aug. 21, 2006).
325 Id.
326 Dispute Settlement DS 267, supra note 263.
327 Brazil to Ask for WTO Cotton Compliance Panel in September, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Aug. 18, 2006, Vol. 24, No. 33.
328 Id.
329 Id.
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Appropriations Act. 330  Though his amendment was eventually
ruled out of order, Grassley argued that his proposal would have
provided $1.1 billion in savings over five years.33' This
amendment, like the Bush Administration's FY 2006 budget
proposal to cut $5.4 billion from farm programs,3 32 has
encountered sharp opposition from parts of the Farm Belt,
especially "[s]outhern cotton and rice growers in the GOP's
political base [that] would be hit particularly hard. 3 33 Though the
Administration eventually backed off its initial proposal under
pressure from southern lawmakers,334 one publication noted that
[t]he proposed Agriculture budget is surprising not only for the
scope of the cuts but also because the biggest losers would be
cotton and rice farmers who largely hail from Southern states
that strongly supported the president's re-election in November,
including those in Mississippi and Texas represented by some of
the most powerful members of Congress. 335
Current maneuvering on the agriculture budget is but a prelude to
a larger fight in 2007 over a new farm bill, as well as the nature of
the United States' commitments to the WTO.336 Regardless of the
results of the 2006 appropriations process, 2007 will afford
Congress plenty of opportunity to focus on the nature and scope of
domestic commodity payments, and their new interaction with the
United States' international commitments under the WTO.
330 Editorial, Grassley's Latest Payment Limit Amendment Defeated, SOUTHWEST
FARM PRESS, Nov. 17, 2005, available at http://southwestfarmpress.com/mag/farming-
grassleysilatest-payment/index.html.
331 Id.
332 Dan Morgan, Farm Subsidies May Not Face Limits; Lawmakers Would Have to
Find Other Ways to Cut Costs, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2005, at A23.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Andrew Martin, Farming's Sacred Cow on Cutting Block; Agriculture Budget
Callsfor5% Reduction in Subsidies, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 5, 2005, at 10.
336 Brazil to Ask for WTO Cotton Compliance Panel in September, supra note 327.
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V. Impacts of United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton on the
Continuing Doha Round Negotiations
A. Deadlock Over Agriculture in General Negotiations
After talks on modalities for agricultural subsidy reductions
and market access provisions floundered in July 2006, WTO
Director-General Pascal Lamy suspended the Doha Round
negotiations indefinitely. 3 7 In his remarks suspending the Round,
Director-General Lamy indicated that "the gap in level of ambition
between market access and domestic support remained too wide to
bridge. This blockage was such that the discussion did not even
move on to the third leg of the triangle-[non-agricultural market
access]. 338 In assessing the blame for the collapse of the talks,
one source assigned responsibility broadly:
[n]o one country is to blame[;] many of the participants are
culpable. India wanted fewer farm subsidies and lower tariffs
but was unwilling to reduce barriers to farm goods and industrial
products; the EC wouldn't cut its farm tariffs; America, the
animating spirit behind earlier trade rounds, declared that a bad
deal was worse than no deal at all-and meant it. The
underlying rationale of unilateral trade liberalisation had been
buried and forgotten long ago.3
39
Following suspension of the talks, there have been some signs
of life for the future of the Doha Round, at least from the usually
optimistic Director-General. 340  In late 2006, Director-General
Lamy indicated that informal talks were continuing, and that if
renewed engagement by party nations continued over the winter,
the negotiating parties "could stay on track to take this Round to a
successful conclusion next year.",341 While it is possible that the
337 WTO, Trade Negotiations Committee, DG Lamy: Time Out Needed to Review
Options and Positions, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/tnc-dg-stat_24
july06-e.htm.
338 Id. Non-agricultural market access includes negotiation on services, intellectual
property, and other trade issues of import to developed countries.
339 The Future of Globalisation, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 11.
340 WTO, General Council, Lamy: "We Can Stay on Track to Successfully Conclude
the Round Next Year," http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news06_e/tncchairreport_
14dec06_e.htm.
341 Id.
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major negotiating positions of the party nations have changed in
the wake of July's suspension of talks, any major developments
have gone unreported---even Director-General Lamy indicates that
"no real changes in numbers, notably in agriculture domestic
support or tariff protection [,] have shown up in these discussions
So far."
34 2
It is then unsurprising that the composition of the WTO
General Body will continue to be a chief determinant for the tenor
and scope of the reform proposals currently under consideration.
In general, the United States and the European Communities
prefer broader reform packages that enhance market access, while
developing countries, which constitute the majority of the General
Body, prefer to focus on decreasing subsidies provided to
producers in developed countries, with little interest beyond cotton
and other sensitive crops.343  As demonstrated by July's
suspension, it is unclear whether the developed or the developing
countries are really driving the negotiations forward.
To demonstrate the gulf between developed and developing
countries, consider the different approaches taken by the United
States and the "West African Four," which are Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali,344 to the agriculture debate.345  First, the
United States, with the support of major U.S. producer groups,346
has called for substantial cuts in domestic support and export
subsidies in exchange for cuts in protective tariffs which block
342 Id.
343 See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Doha Dev. Agenda Policy Brief, U.S.
Proposal for Bold Reform in Global Agriculture Trade (Dec. 2005),
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2005/asset-upload-file281_8
526.pdf (describing the United States' position); WTO Cotton Sub-Committee, Two
Cotton Proposals for Hong Kong Conference Discussed (Nov. 18, 2005),
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news05_e/cotton_18nov05_e.htm (describing the
West Africa Four's proposal).
344 Of the West Africa Four, Benin and Chad were complaining parties in United
States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton. Appellate Body Cotton Report, supra note 14.
345 See NARLIKAR, supra note 143, at 34-39 (describing the formation and dynamics
of developing country voting blocs within the WTO).
346 See generally Statement by Bob Stallman, President, American Farm Bureau
Federation, Regarding Conclusion of Hong Kong Ministerial World Trade Talks (Dec.
19, 2005), http://www.fb.org (highlight "newsroom," select hyperlink "news releases,"
select hyperlink "2005 news releases," select link "Dec. 29, 2005").
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market access for American agricultural products.347 Specifically,
the United States calls for a reduction of tariffs by developed
countries of 55-90%, with all tariffs capped at 75%.348 The cuts
are deemed to be "progressive," with developing countries forced
to cut tariffs less through differential and preferential treatment,
provided they meet certain criteria.34 9
Further, the United States' proposal calls for the termination of
all export subsidies, including direct export subsidies, and export
credit programs that allow repayment after 180 days, by 20 10.350
Finally, the United States calls for significant reductions in
domestic crop support over the next five years, with the United
States cutting payments by a total of 53%, and the EC cutting
payments by 75%.351 Specifically, the proposal calls for a 60%
reduction in U.S. amber box payments, and an 83% reduction in
EC amber box payments. 352  Reductions in the trade-distorting
amber box payments that came to the fore in United States-
Subsidies on Upland Cotton are coupled with strict limitations of
blue box payments to a percentage of total production.353
The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI)
at the University of Missouri published a study demonstrating the
potential impact of full implementation of the United States' WTO
proposal for subsidy reform on net farm income.354 If the United
States unilaterally implemented its proposal without corresponding
concessions from the rest of the world, net farm income in the
United States would decrease by 3.6% between 2012-2014, and if
the proposal was fully implemented by all WTO member nations,
347 U.S. Proposal for Bold Reform in Global Agriculture Trade, supra note 343.
348 Id.
349 Id. It is interesting to note that the criteria for receiving "differential and
preferential treatment" is not defined in the U.S. plan, perhaps reserving room for
negotiation. Id.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 U.S. Proposal for Bold Reform in Global Agriculture Trade, supra note 343.
354 FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (FAPRI), POTENTIAL
IMPACTS ON U.S. AGRICULTURE OF THE U.S. OCTOBER 2005 WTO PROPOSAL, at 24,
FAPRI-UIC REPORT #16-05 (Dec. 15, 2005).
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net farm income could increase by as much as 6.5%."5 With this
in mind, it is no wonder U.S. interests prefer no deal to a bad deal.
Only if other members of the WTO provide market access to U.S.
agricultural products will there be a benefit to U.S. farmers, whose
support is necessary to secure passage of most any trade deal
through Congress.356
In contrast, the West African Four have limited their proposals
to those centering on cotton. Specifically, just before the Hong
Kong Ministerial took place in December 2005, these nations
called for the immediate elimination of all export subsidies for
cotton, as well as an 80% reduction of trade-distorting amber box
payments by the end of 2006, leading to the complete elimination
of amber box payments for cotton by 2009."' 7 In addition, the
West African proposal calls for "substantial improvements" in
market access for least-developed nations, as well as an
international emergency fund to bolster low cotton prices.358 In his
presentation of this proposal, the ambassador from Benin stated
that the West African Four "hope[d] the European Union and
United States will bring more to the table in Hong Kong so that
the conference can produce concrete results."35 9
What is most striking about these proposals is how they differ
on their fundamental approaches to the issue-the United States
views the agriculture negotiations comprehensively, and calls for
modest concessions from developing countries in exchange for
expansive reform of developed countries' subsidy programs.3 6 In
contrast, the West African Proposal appears to demand unilateral
concession from the developed world on a moral theory, instead of
a balanced negotiation posture-there are no concessions, just
demands.36' While the legitimacy of these demands hinges on the
355 Id. at iii-v. According to the study, the extent of the gain in farm income
garnered by the U.S. proposal will depend on the extent of U.S. reforms to direct
commodity payments to farmers; if direct payments are eliminated entirely, the gain in
farm income would be reduced. Id.
356 See generally In the Twilight of Doha, ECONOMIST, July 29, 2006, at 64.
357 Two Cotton Proposals for Hong Kong Conference Discussed, supra note 343.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 U.S. Proposal for Bold Reform in Global Agriculture Trade, supra note 343.
361 Two Cotton Proposals for Hong Kong Conference Discussed, supra note 343
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perspective of the observer and is outside the scope of this
Comment,3 62 developing countries have shifted the Doha Round
agenda from one of multilateral trade negotiation to a forum
publicizing their social justice and individual development
interests.
B. United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Response by
the Developing World and the United States
Given that the developing world's emphasis is on securing,
rather than offering, concessions in trade negotiations, it is only
logical that these countries seek to advance their agenda through a
forum where consensus is not required. Regardless of the
substance of the Appellate Body's recommendations, it is clear
that United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton was a tremendous
win for developing countries as they look to the future. Perhaps
most important is the fundamental shift in the DSB's position on
the "peace clause" and the interaction of the Agriculture
Agreement and SCM when considering agriculture disputes in the
future.363 As indicated by the U.S. agriculture community, they
were caught off-guard by the interpretation and new limits placed
on amber box subsidies reached by the Appellate Body.3 64 In
particular, these concerns focus on the relatively vague notions of
"serious prejudice" that can deeply affect treatment of "amber
box" domestic commodity support in the United States.365
Developing countries, emboldened by the cotton decision, are
moving to secure further concessions.3 66 Uruguay's envoy to the
WTO recently announced that his country had made the decision
(describing the West Africa Four's proposal).
362 It is important to note that Benin, Chad, and Mali, three of the West Africa Four,
are also AGOA nations, and already receive preferential trade treatment on a variety of
apparel and textile related products. See supra Part IV.A.
363 See Cotton Panel Report, supra note 266, 7.1503.
364 See Lange, supra note 321.
365 Id. This point is put into particularly stark terms by efforts by influential
members of Congress to adjust "amber box" subsidy payments to meet the new
constraints raised by United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton. See supra text
accompanying note 294.
366 See, e.g., Bill Lambrecht, U.S. Faces New Threat at WTO on Rice; Uruguay
Aims to Mimic Brazil's Successful Fight of Subsidies on Cotton, ST. LoUIS POST-
DIsPATCH, Aug. 7, 2005, at B 1.
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to move forward with a complaint against the United States for
rice subsidies.367  While Uruguay has yet to file a formal
complaint, the Uruguayan delegate indicated that its potential
complaint could "resemble Brazil's successful cotton
challenge. ' 368 Though Uruguay has backed off from its combative
posture because it would be difficult to prove damages in a time of
high worldwide rice prices, the blueprint for a successful argument
against the United States' amber box subsidies is still relevant
here.369
In addition, developing countries are attempting to strengthen
their already strong hand in DSB matters37° by seeking a
"developing country pays" system of compensation following
successful DSB complaints.37 ' These new proposals come in the
face of new concerns with possible "legislating through the new
dispute settlement system., 372  The old system of dispute
settlement under the GATT made use of consensual negotiations
between the parties to place considerable pressure on the
offending nation to change.37 3 In contrast, the more binding panel
decision of the DSB moves away from a consensus-based
approach to one that usually finds the winner of a case demanding
that the loser fully comply with the panel's recommendations.374
Further strengthening of a DSB process that already favors the
complaining party will likely embolden developing nations to
move forward with their development agenda through the DSB
deadlocked multilateral negotiations.
These trends, as well as the failure of the Doha Round to
produce tangible progress in comprehensive trade liberalization,
have provided added impetus to the United States' effort to secure
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 USTR Backs Off from Uruguay Rice Talks as Threat of Case Lessens, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Sept. 29, 2006, Vol. 24, No. 39.
370 See generally Mota, supra note 235, at 104 (1999) (indicating that the success
rate for countries bringing a complaint under the DSU is relatively high).
371 DAS, supra note 215, at 75-78.
372 Robert E. Baldwin, Key Challenges Facing the WTO, in DOHA AND BEYOND:
THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 53-54 (Mike Moore, ed., 2004).
373 Id. at 54.
374 Id.
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immediate gains through bilateral and multilateral trade
agreements. Following the precedent set by the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the 1990's, the Bush
Administration has pursued negotiations independent from the
WTO with a wide range of countries.3 75 In many cases, these
agreements evidence a larger political strategy relevant not only to
current proceedings in the WTO, but also the larger fight against
global terrorism. 376 With current bilateral negotiations continuing
between several nations, the United States is moving forward with
its own national trade agenda even as WTO talks continue to
founder.377
The United States' ability to engage in any trade negotiations,
whether through the WTO or with strategic partners, will be
constrained should it fail to renew Trade Promotion Authority
(TPA) before its expiration in June 2007.378 As authorized by the
Trade Act of 2002,379 TPA gives the President authority to enter
into and complete trade negotiations, allowing Congress only an
up or down vote without the possibility of amendment on the final
agreement.38 ° Of course, should TPA expire, Congress would then
be able to amend the agreements to reflect regional or political
concerns, which could ultimately upset the delicate balance of a
375 See, e.g., Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade
Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html (last visited Mar.
10, 2007).
376 The United States has moved to expand its free trade zone southward through the
Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), the Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement and the Chile Free Trade Agreement, which applies additional
pressure on Brazil to enter negotiations for a new Free Trade Area of the Americas. See
id. Moreover, recent completion of free trade agreements with Israel, Morocco, Bahrain,
Jordan, and Oman possibly indicate an economic reward for those nations who have
proved to be of assistance through the United States' war on global terrorism, and its
action in Iraq. See id. Similar motivations could also be at work in the 2004 U.S.-
Australia Free Trade Agreement. See id.
377 See, e.g., United States Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Facts on the U.S.-
Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations (July 11, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/DocumentLibrary/Fact Sheets/2005/asset upload-file994_7853.pdf.
378 Revival of Doha Round May Depend on TPA, J. CoM., July 31, 2006, at 8.
379 Trade Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3803-3805 (2006).
380 The White House, What is Trade Promotion Authority?, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/infocus/intemationaltrade/talkers.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007).
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carefully negotiated deal.38' With the President's party losing
control of Congress in the 2006 elections, some commentators are
already calling renewal of TPA a "'dead letter,"' which might spur
a renewal of multilateral talks before TPA expires.382
With the broad gulf remaining between negotiating parties in
the current Doha Round, the expiration of TPA looming in mid-
2007, and pressures to enact a new Farm Bill that fully complies
with WTO strictures, it appears that U.S. agriculture is facing the
worst of all scenarios delineated by the FAPRI study-reduction
of domestic subsidies without a corresponding increase in market
access around the world. 383 Though United States-Subsidies on
Upland Cotton is by no means a "checkmate" against the
enormous negotiating power held by the United States in the
WTO, it might have the effect of achieving one of the key goals
sought by the developing world-reducing the subsidies provided
by a prominent developed country.
VI. Conclusion
Clearly, the DSB's adoption of the Appellate Body report in
United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton is a major milestone
in not only the future of the current Doha Round of trade
negotiations, but also the shape and scope of the WTO itself. At
the same time that the WTO is wracked by contention relating to
basic talks over agriculture and textiles, the dispute resolution
process is quietly becoming the epicenter for the trade negotiations
themselves. As confidence grows in the capability of the DSB,
and as further decisions grow in customary weight, it is possible
that "interpreting" and "enforcing" the current agreement may
become as important as creating a new program of reforms
through general negotiations.
Current dispute resolution proposals emphasize greater
enforcement powers given to the DSB, making its opinions more
transparent as well as compulsory on subject parties.384 As this
381 id.
382 US Election Casts Cloud over Bush Trade Drive, TURKISH DAILY NEWS SOURCE:
FIN. TIMES INFO. LTD, Oct. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=5661 0.
383 See supra text accompanying note 314.
384 See DAS, supra at note 215, at 54-55.
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process develops, it will be important to consider whether a
detached international entity such as the DSB can maintain the
credibility needed to survive the political ramifications that result
from its decisions in the member countries. The WTO is at a
crossroads between the consensus-oriented comprehensive
negotiations of its General Council, and the immediate
concessions that usually result from complaints filed with the
DSB.
Recent DSB matters continue to not only frame but advance
the debate around negotiations within the General Council. If this
pattern continues, the DSB might supplant the General Council as
the chief means of exacting concessions from other nations. Can
the growing confidence in the DSB be sustained as it grows in
relevance and authority, or will the center fall through, resulting in
a lack of respect for panel findings? Given the current trajectory
of negotiations and proceedings in the DSB, this is certainly a
question that will be answered sooner rather than later.
While developing nations might find immediate benefit
through shifting the focus of the WTO from multilateral,
consensus-based negotiation to a forum for unilateral concession
and one-sided economic development, it is the finest of lines to
walk. The United States' unflinching commitment to a strategy of
multilateral concession and broad-based reform, augmented with
unilateral charity in the form of AGOA and other development
initiatives, provides a potential glimpse of U.S. policy in a future
with a broken WTO.
The fundamental issue raised by the continued impasse is that
nations now seem to believe that opening their markets to imports
is somehow a "concession," rather than a benefit to the large
majority of their citizens. 385  As one source rightly states,
"[m]ultilateral liberalisation is a sort of jujitsu that uses exporters'
determination to get into foreign markets to overwhelm domestic
lobbies that would sooner keep home markets closed. '386 The
current effort to turn the Doha Round into a moral effort aimed at
the developing world 387 has only further entrenched the political
385 The Future of Globalisation, supra note 339, at 11.
386 Id.
387 See, e.g., Two Cotton Proposals for Hong Kong Conference Discussed, supra
note 343 (describing the West Africa Four's proposal).
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positions of negotiating parties, instead of focusing attention on
the real purpose of trade liberalization: tearing down political
impediments through multilateral agreements to make real
improvements in the economic future of the disadvantaged.388
As a result, the real impact of United States-Subsidies of
Upland Cotton is only to further the current "penny-wise, pound
foolish" approach to the current Doha Round that allows
politicians victories at home as they sacrifice real economic gains
at the negotiating table. So while the developing world can rightly
celebrate its largely rhetorical victory in tearing down inequitable
subsidies today, it has also eliminated a key bargaining chip from
future talks and added further contentiousness to the negotiations.
In the end, if developing countries continue to use the dispute
resolution system, which was designed to provide a deterrent
against reneging on multilateral commitments-as a means of
seeking unilateral concession-the result might be the preclusion
of a future comprehensive agreement that would make more than
just a political impact. Political victories might have short-term
value, but cannot fix the systemic economic issues that continue to
plague developing countries. Multilateral trade liberalization,
however, will.
MICHAEL J. SHIUMAKER
388 Obviously, this is a point of some contention. However, several texts provide
balanced theoretical analysis of the general benefits and costs of trade liberalization. See
generally RICHARD E. CAVES & RONALD W. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND PAYMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION 24-29 (1981) (putting forth the traditional theoretical justification for
trade, and the. economic solution for market distortions); RONALD FINDLAY,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY 1-8 (1973) (providing historical
background for the theoretical analysis of trade, and its implications on the development
agenda); THE GAINS FROM TRADE AND THE GAINS FROM AID: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE THEORY 203 (Murray C. Kemp, ed. 1995) (abstracting away from conventional
trade models to demonstrate that free trade has economic benefit even in a marketplace
with significant economic distortion).
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